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ABSTRACT
Hyperlinking, at once an essential means of navigating the Internet, but also a
frequent means to enable infringement of copyright, challenges courts to articulate
the legal norms that underpin domestic and international copyright law, in order to
ensure effective enforcement of exclusive rights on the one hand, while preserving
open communication on the Internet on the other. Several recent cases, primarily in
the European Union, demonstrate the difficulties of enforcing the right of
communication to the public (or, in U.S. copyright parlance, the right of public
performance by transmission) against those who provide hyperlinks that effectively
deliver infringing content to Internet users. This Article will first address the
international norms that domestic laws of states members to the multilateral
copyright agreements must implement. It next will explore how two of the most
significant regional or national copyright regimes, the E.U. and the U.S., have coped
with the question of linking, and then will consider the relationship of the emerging
approaches to copyright infringement with national and regional laws instituting
limited immunity for copyright infringements committed by internet service
providers. We will conclude with an assessment of the extent to which the outcomes
under U.S. and E.U. regimes, despite their apparently different approaches, in fact
converge.
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INTRODUCTION
Hyperlinks connect Internet users to content residing on the Internet. “Simple”
links take the user to a website’s home page from which she may navigate to specific
works; “deep” and “in-line” or “framing” links bring the user directly to the content
the user seeks, in the latter case by presenting the content “framed” by the website
the user first consulted to locate the requested works.1 Linking, at once an essential
means of navigating the Internet, but also a frequent means to enable infringement
of copyright, challenges courts to articulate the legal norms that underpin domestic
and international copyright law, in order to ensure effective enforcement of exclusive
rights on the one hand, while preserving open communication on the Internet on the
other. Several recent cases, primarily in the European Union, demonstrate the
difficulties of enforcing the right of communication to the public (or, in U.S.
copyright parlance, the right of public performance by transmission) against those
who provide hyperlinks that effectively deliver infringing content to Internet users.
This Article will first address the international norms that domestic laws of states
members to the multilateral copyright agreements must implement. It next will
explore how two of the most significant regional or national copyright regimes, the
E.U and the U.S., have coped with the question of linking, and then will consider the
relationship of the emerging approaches to copyright infringement with national and
regional laws instituting limited immunity for copyright infringements committed by
Internet service providers. We will conclude with an assessment of the extent to
which the outcomes under U.S. and E.U. regimes, despite their apparently different
approaches, in fact converge.
I.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

Because hyperlinks enable users to access content residing on the Internet, one
may conceptualize the provision of a hyperlink as a form of making works available
to the public. The 1996 WIPO Copyright treaties introduced the “making available”
right in order to modernize the exclusive right of communication to the public under
the Berne Convention, 2 to make it suitable for implementation in the digital
environment.3 The Berne Convention includes rights of communication to the public

1. The terms “in-line linking” and “framing” are conceptually very similar. Generally, “in-line
linking” or “embedded linking” refers to the process of importing a piece of content from another website
through a hyperlink. “Framing” is a more specific term that refers to the combination of materials from
different sources on a single website through in-line hyperlinks, but may refer specifically to uses in which
the imported content is presented independently through a “gateway” or “independently scrollable
frame[].” See Mark Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1273, 1297–99 (2001). For clarity, this Article will use the term “in-line linking” to refer to
both practices.
2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised
July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force in the
United States Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
3. Mihaly Ficsor, The Spring 1997 Horace S. Manges Lecture—Copyright for the Digital Era:
The WIPO “Internet” Treaties, 21 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 197, 209–11 (1997) (noting that the “making
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by primary and secondary transmission by wired and wireless means, but does not
consolidate these rights into a single comprehensive and coherent article. Rather, the
1971 Paris text disperses the communication to the public right across a variety of
dispositions, leaving several gaps both as to subject matter covered by the right, and
as to the exclusive rights conferred. Despite those gaps, it is clear that the
communication to the public right reaches acts of both initial and re-communication
of works; article 11bis, for example, concerns third parties’ free-to-air and wired
retransmissions of broadcasts of protected works.4 It is, arguably, less clear that the
Berne Convention’s right of communication to the public extended to individualized
“pull” technologies, in addition to transmissions simultaneously communicated to
the public (“push” technologies).5
Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) fills in the Berne Convention
blanks with respect both to subject matter and to scope of the communication to the
public right.6 All initial and subsequent transmissions of works of authorship to the
public come within the scope of the exclusive right. Article 8 contributes further
detail to the communication to the public right, by specifying that the right of
communication to the public includes a right of “making available to the public of
[literary and artistic] works in such a way that members of the public may access
those works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”7 This right
targets individualized on-demand (“pull”) communications (by any technical
means), for it makes clear that the members of the public may be separated both in
space and in time.8 The WCT does not define the “public” to whom the works are
made available, but it states that the “public” is composed of “members,” and, thus
implies that the “public” need not be populous, although the greater the numbers to
whom a work is made available, the more apparent the conclusion that the making
available was to “the public.” 9 Certainly, simply offering the work on an

available” provision in the WIPO Copyright Treaty was meant in part to “clarif[y]” the concepts of
distribution and communication to the public in the context of digital transmissions).
4. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 11bis(1)(ii) (giving authors the exclusive right of
authorizing “any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work,
when this communication is made by an organization other than the original one”).
5. See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶¶ 12.47-12.51 (2006).
6. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT]. Similar
solutions were adopted in the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, arts. 10 & 14, Dec. 20, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
7. WCT, supra note 6, art. 8.
8. JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES ON COPYRIGHT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE WCT, THE WPPT, AND THE BTAP ¶ 7.8.36 (2015) (noting that Art. 8 WCT
“cover[s] all situations involving an individual time and place of access” including both “pull-technology,
which requires the user to ‘demand’ that a work be transmitted to his terminal,” and “push-technology, by
which the works are ‘pushed’ to the email address of the user and may be accessed by him at this address
at any time and from any place”).
9. Id. at ¶ 7.8.39 (“If works are made available in the framework of a social network, a chat group,
or mailing list, the question of whether the works are made available ‘to the public’ depends on the
characteristics of the groups of persons to whom the works are made available and on the definition of
‘public’ under the relevant national law . . . . In most cases, such groups will constitute a ‘public’ . . . [but]
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undiscriminating basis, so that any member of the general public may access the
work, should come within the scope of the right.10 Even a more narrowly defined
class of intended recipients, such as the fans of a particular musician, or students of
twentieth-century photorealist painting, may appeal to an audience potentially too
large for a “family circle” or similar exclusion.
It is not necessary that the offer be accepted: as the phrase “may access”
establishes, “making available” embraces incipient as well as effected
communications.11 Similarly, because the right targets individualized transmissions,
the relevant measure is not whether the number of recipients exceeds that of a family
circle, but whether the number of persons to whom access to the content is offered
exceeds that of a family circle. The work is “made available” even if only one
member of that public, or indeed none, in fact demands the work’s delivery.
The technological means of “making available” are irrelevant; unlike the Berne
Convention articles differentiating wired and wireless transmissions, WCT article 8
is expressed in technologically neutral terms. 12 Moreover, member states may
comply with the right either through local communication rights, or, for those
countries who have applied the distribution right to temporary digital copies, through
the right to distribute copies, as the United States urged during the drafting period.13
In adopting what came to be known as the “umbrella solution,” allowing member
states to implement the making available right through any domestic law exclusive
the electronic mailing of a work . . . to one particular person does not constitute making available ‘to the
public’ . . . .”).
10. Id. at ¶ 7.8.38 (“Beyond doubt, the making available of works on a home page or any server
that may even be accessed through broader networks, in particular over the internet, is an act of making
available to the public.”).
11. Memorandum Prepared by the Chairman of the Committees of Experts, ¶ 10.10, CRNR/DC/4,
(Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter WCT Basic Proposal I], in WIPO, 1 Records of the Diplomatic Conference
on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, at 204 (1996), https://perma.cc/WF32-AK6X
(“The relevant act is the making available of the work by providing access to it. What counts is the initial
act of making the work available, not the mere provision of server space, communication connections, or
facilities for the carriage and routing of signals. It is irrelevant whether copies are available for the user
or whether the work is simply made perceptible to, and thus usable by, the user.”); REINBOTHE & VON
LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at ¶ 7.8.27 (noting that “the mere wording of Article 8, part 2 WCT” shows that
the “act of making available to the public only needs to allow that members of the public ‘may access’ the
work” and that, accordingly, “users do not necessarily need to access the work in order to trigger the
making available right”) (emphasis omitted).
12. See WCT Basic Proposal I, supra note 11, at ¶ 10.14 (“The technology used may be analog or
digital, and it may be based on electromagnetic waves or guided optical beams. The use of the nonrestrictive term ‘any’ in front of the word ‘communication’ in [Article 8], and in certain provisions of the
Berne Convention, emphasizes the breadth of the act of communication.”); Ficsor, supra note 3, at 210
(noting that the “making available” right is “described in a neutral way, free from specific legal
characterization (for example, as making available a work to the public by wire or by wireless means, for
access); [is not] technology-specific and, at the same time, [expresses] the interactive nature of digital
transmissions”); REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at ¶ 7.8.29 (“The technical means of making
the work available are irrelevant.”) (emphasis omitted).
13. See WIPO, 2 Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions, ¶ 301, at 675 (1996), https://perma.cc/E5KL-XCSF [hereinafter 1996 Records] (“[The
United States delegation] stressed the understanding . . . that [the new “making available” right] might be
implemented in national legislation through application of any particular exclusive right, . . . as long as
the acts described in those Articles were covered by such rights.”).
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right or combination of them, the drafters opted for an approach of juridical as well
as technological neutrality.14
As an instance of the communication to the public right, the scope of the making
available right’s coverage of on-demand access encompasses both initial and
secondary transmissions.15 It thus covers both the provision of direct access and at
least certain forms of indirect access to literary and artistic works. The extent to
which the making available right reaches intermediated on-demand access to works,
particularly via hyperlinks, requires examination. Consider the following scenarios:
(1) a user enters the URL of a website in order to access works stored on the site.
Here, the user directly contacts the initial source of the transmission of the requested
content. In the second two scenarios, by contrast, the user contacts an intermediary
who will direct her to a third-party source site from which the requested content will
be transmitted. (2) A website aggregates links to other websites from which users
can download unauthorized copies of recorded music. Some links are identified by
the name of the music file; clicking on these links takes the user directly to another
website and automatically downloads the named file from that third-party website to
the user’s hard drive. (3) Other links are identified by the names of the third-party
websites; clicking on these sends the user to the named website, from which she may
navigate to and elect to download a variety of files. In (3), the linking site does not
directly send digital files of the recorded music to users who access the linked-to site.
From the user’s point of view, the experience of acquiring the file in (1) and (2)
is the same; either way, she contacts the first site and receives the file without the
apparent further intervention of another website operator. In (3), the user knows she
is being taken to another site from which she may download files of recorded music.
In all three scenarios, the websites on which the content is stored are making works
available to the public; whether the members of the public enter the site’s URL to
gain access to the works directly from the source site, or the members of the public
access the works on the source site through the intermediary of a link, either way the
source site will be communicating the works to members of the public. But, in cases
(2) and (3), is the first-accessed site, by providing a link that routes the user directly
(2) or indirectly (3) to the content residing on the source site, also “making [the files]
available” to the members of the public who, through the intermediary of the link,
contact the source site? Does it matter whether the user knows that the file is coming

14. For extensive discussion of the “umbrella solution,” by the coiner of the term, see MIHALY
FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 204-10 (2002).
15. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at at ¶ 7.8.18 (“[A]ny new act of making available
a work via the internet, for example through a separate upload or link on a second website to the one where
the work was originally made available, or through a search engine, represents a new act of making
available to the public.”) (citations omitted); Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI),
Opinion on the criterion “New Public”, developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
put in the context of making available and communication to the public, 9 (Sept. 17, 2014) [hereinafter
ALAI New Public Opinion], https://perma.cc/ZN2Y-U8TZ (“Article 11bis(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention
brings within the general scope of the communication to the public right secondary transmissions made
by a different communication entity; the text may be said to support a requirement of a new communicator
in the case of a new transmission of a prior broadcast.”) (emphasis omitted).
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from the site she contacted, or from some other site? Put another way, does it matter
that in (2) the content appears to the user to be coming from the linking site, while in
(3) it is apparent that the linked-to site is offering the content?
The text of the Article 8 (and Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”)) “making available” right may supply an answer.16
It gives authors the exclusive right of allowing members of the public to access
literary and artistic works (and recorded performances) “from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them.” The “place” contemplated most likely refers to the
physical place where the member of the public is located (for example, at home)
when she requests the content. The text also implies that the “place” is one to which
the content will be sent, and that “place” might be anywhere the member of the public
and her receiving device (for example, a cell phone, notebook, or laptop computer)
are located. But the text might also be read to refer to the networked “place,” e.g.,
website, that the user contacts in order to gain access to the work.17 Applying that
interpretation, in scenario (3), the connection between accessing the first site and the
communication of the work may be too attenuated, because the user knows that the
site from which she is receiving the work is no longer the site she first contacted.18
The linked-to site becomes the place from which the user chooses to access the work,
rather than the linking site. In scenario (2), by contrast, the place from which the
user appears to be accessing the music is the site the user initially contacted, which
is the only site she chose. Accordingly, though the ultimate source of the
communication is not the linker’s site, the linker will be making the work available
to a user who has “chosen” to access the content from the linker’s site.19
Under this approach, then, the WCT “making available” right will reach certain,
but not all, acts of secondary communication of content residing on third-party
websites. Notably, this interpretation of the WCT views the act of making available
from an economic perspective: the site from which the user chooses to access the
16. The following analysis elaborates on an approach proposed in RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra
note 5, at ¶¶ 12.60-12.61.
17. Nothing in the 1996 Records indicates that the language “from a place and at a time individually
chosen by them” received special attention, apart from general endorsement of its adaptability to digital
communications. See 1996 Records, supra note 13.
18. This does not mean that the linking site incurs no liability: if the linker is willfully directing
users to an infringing source, it may be liable for facilitating copyright infringement. Arguably the
direction in the Berne Convention arts. 11bis, 11ter, and 14, and WCT art. 8 that authors “shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing” communications to the public anticipates that member states will provide
redress for facilitation (effectively, unauthorized authorization) of infringement, whether on the basis of
direct or indirect liability. The Court of Justice of the European Union has recently brought acts of
facilitation of infringement within the scope of direct liability. See section II.A, infra. For consideration
of the liability of a site that links to a third-party site that in turn links to an infringing site, see Pekka
Savola, EU Copyright Liability for Internet Linking, J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. INFORMATION TECH. & ECOMMERCE L, 2017 at 4.1 (discussing the ambiguity in the GS Media case whether a “linker [is] also
responsible for linking . . . to websites which include . . . clickable links to infringing material”).
19. While this interpretation might suggest that the website from which the content is in fact
(despite appearances) emanating is not “making [that content] available” to the user who obtains the
content via a deep or in-line link, it will not matter to the source site’s liability for “making available” that
some content recipients are not aware of the source: so long as the source website can be contacted directly
or via a simple link, it is still making content available to users in general.

GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018)

160

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[41:2

content reaps the economic benefits of the user’s choice, for example, by exposing
her to that site’s advertising, or simply by prolonging the user’s visit to that website.20
This interpretation of the WCT also comports with a functional view: the operation
“feels” to the user as if she is receiving the content from the intermediary.21
II. E.U. LAW ON LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING
The European Union has incorporated the WCT making available right verbatim
in article 3(2) of the 2001 Information Society Directive.22 Article 3 covers the right
of communication to the public. The Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) in Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, held hyperlinking to be a form of
“making available,” even though providing a link simply furnishes a means to access
a work offered from a third-party site.23 That the linker may be an intermediary, and
that no communication will result unless the user clicks on the link, did not dissuade
the court from holding links within the ambit of “making available”:
[T]he provision, on a website, of clickable links to protected works published without any access
restrictions on another site, affords users of the first site direct access to those works. . . . [A] work

20. Some commentators have noted that the CJEU’s interpretation of Directive 2001/29/EC (which
implements the art. 8 WCT “making available” right in the EU) takes a similar “economic” approach,
focusing not on “the legal monopoly of the authors,” but on “whether the [defendant] economically
exploits the copyright protected subject matter.” Matthias Leistner, Europe’s Copyright Law Decade:
Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice and Policy Perspectives, 51 COMMON MARKET L.
REV. 559, 570 (2014) (emphasis supplied). Cf. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at ¶ 7.8.18
(noting that “[t]he right of [making available] to the public . . . must be interpreted according to its purpose,
[which is] to cover important acts of exploitation [of] the [copyright holder’s] exclusive right” and that
because the aim of the “making available” provision is “to grant the author the right to exploit his work
by way of communication to the public,” the right should not be limited to allow actors to design business
models “conceived to avoid the application of these rights by using certain technical designs”); FICSOR,
supra note 14, at 205 (“[I]n those cases where digital delivery resulting in copies becomes a normal way
of exploiting works and other productions, it will not be sufficient to grant owners of rights a simple right
to remuneration . . . . In such a case, an exclusive right of authorization should be granted.”).
21. Some WCT signatories have declined to adopt this functional view, and have refused to impose
direct liability on such intermediary actors who do not actually “store and serve” the content to the user.
See Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843–45 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (albeit without reference to the
WCT). See also infra section III.A. (discussing the “server rule” adopted in the U.S.). For example, in
the U.S., a site which provides a hyperlink which, when clicked, causes the automatic download of an
infringing file from a third-party website cannot incur direct copyright liability, even if the user may not
understand that the linking site is not actually providing the work. See id. However, the travaux
préparatoires of the WCT indicate that the “relevant act is the making available of the work by providing
access to it” and that technical processes like “the mere provision of server space” are less relevant than
the “initial act of making the work available.” WCT Basic Proposal I, supra note 11, at ¶ 10.10 (emphasis
supplied). Therefore, these technically-based approaches to hyperlinking liability may not be wholly
consistent with the policy behind the “making available” right. See infra section III.A.3.c. (discussing the
tension between the “making available” right and the current state of U.S. law).
22. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. (L
167) 1 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29].
23. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, at ¶ 20 (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE.
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is made available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it,
24
irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity. . . .

That said, the CJEU in fact curtailed the reach of the making available right with
respect to hyperlinks by further holding that even though hyperlinks are a
“communication to the public,” when hyperlinks offer to recommunicate content
already available on another website, the link, to be actionable, must either reach the
public by a different technological means than the initial communication, or must
reach a “new public” not contemplated by the right holder in authorizing the initial
communication.25 Because the Court determined that all Internet users constituted
the same “public,” at least when the originating site did not limit access to the
content, the “new public” criterion as applied in Svensson effectively excluded links
to unrestricted websites from the scope of the communication-to-the-public right. In
a subsequent decision, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, involving
the provision of links to an unlawful source, the Court imposed an additional, and
subjective, criterion of knowledge of the illicit character of the targeted site.26 In
both cases, copyright scholars have criticized the Court’s reasoning, 27 notably
because the “new public” criterion lacks legal basis in the international copyright
treaties.28 Nonetheless, the knowledge condition in particular, however debatable,
avoided a potentially oppressive application of copyright to the great majority of
Internet users who are unaware that the sites to which they may be supplying links
are illicit.
As a result of these decisions, it appeared that in the case of secondary
communications, at least via hyperlinks, the Court of Justice, by imposing a
knowledge criterion, was calling into question the nature of the communication to
24.

Id. at ¶¶ 18-20 (paragraph numerals omitted):

In the circumstances of this case, it must be observed that the provision, on a website, of clickable
links to protected works published without any access restrictions on another site, affords users of
the first site direct access to those works.
As is apparent from Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, for there to be an ‘act of communication’,
it is sufficient, in particular, that a work is made available to a public in such a way that the persons
forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity
(see, by analogy, Case C-306/05 SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519, paragraph 43).
It follows that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, the provision
of clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and, therefore,
an ‘act of communication’, within the meaning of that provision.
25. Id. at ¶ 24.
26. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶ 55 (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6.
27. See, e.g., Pierre Sirinelli, Alexandra Bensamoun & Josée-Anne Benazeraf, Le droit de
communication au public, 251 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR [RIDA] 207 (2017);
Matthias Leistner, Closing the Book on Hyperlinks: A Brief Outline of the CJEU’s Caselaw and Proposal
for European Legislative Reform, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [EIPR] 327 (2017); P. Bernt Hugenholtz
& Sam C. van Velze, Communication to a New Public? Three Reasons Why EU Copyright Law Can Do
Without a “New Public” 47 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 797 (2016); ALAI New Public
Opinion, supra note 15; ALAI, Opinion of ALAI’s Executive Committee on the Right of communication
to the public; the Advocate General’s Opinions in Filmspeler Case C-527/15 and Ziggo Case C-610/15
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/3MQ3-VH42.
28. See ALAI New Public Opinion, supra note 15.
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the public right (and therefore of copyright in general). After all, proof of a violation
of a “true” property right does not require the right holder to establish that the
defendant knew that he was violating an exclusive right. The court’s later decisions,
however, suggest that the Court has gradually achieved a European harmonization
of the law on derivative liability (i.e., liability in the second degree) for violation of
the right of communication to the public by hyperlinking and other indirect means of
providing access to protected works.29 Moreover, harmonization at the E.U. level
was necessary given both the lack of uniformity regarding secondary liability across
the national laws of the member states,30 and the growing economic importance of
furnishing the means to access infringing sources (without serving as the initial
source of the infringing communication).31
A. HARMONIZATION OF THE LAW OF COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC AS
APPLIED TO THE FACILITATION OF INFRINGEMENT BY HYPERLINKING AND
OTHER MEANS
Both of the CJEU’s later cases concerned facilitation of illicit communications to
the public: in Stichting Brein v. Wullums (Filmspeler)32 through the sale of a device
which connected to a television screen and which was supplied with hyperlinks
pointing to illicit Internet streaming sites, and in Stichting Brein v. Ziggo33 through
the services of The Pirate Bay (“TPB”), a P2P BitTorrent indexation site that enabled
Internet users to locate audiovisual works in the hard disks of other participants in

29. Cf. Alain Strowel, Note on Svensson, 2014/3-4 AUTEURS & MEDIA 224, 232 (raising the
question of a “complete harmonization of the right of communication to the public”).
30. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, in Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and
XS4All Internet BV, at ¶ 3 (June 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J (“The European Commission,
whose opinion appears to me to be shared by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
contends that liability for sites of this type is a matter of copyright application, which can be resolved not
at the level of EU law but under the domestic legal systems of the Member States. Such an approach
would, however, mean that liability, and ultimately the scope of the copyright holders’ rights, would
depend on the very divergent solutions adopted under the different national legal systems. That would
undermine the objective of EU legislation in the relatively abundant field of copyright, which is precisely
to harmonise the scope of the rights enjoyed by authors and other rightholders within the single market.
That is why the answer to the problems raised in the present case must, in my view, be sought rather in
EU law.”). See also Birgit Clark & Julia Dickenson, Theseus and the Labyrinth? An Overview of
“Communication to the Public” Under EU Copyright Law, 39 EIPR 265, 277 (2017) (adverting to “real
challenges of not having a common conception of secondary liability within the EU legal framework”).
31. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright
in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016), at recitals 37-39 [hereinafter 2016
Proposal]. See also Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay International, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, I-6073, available
at https://perma.cc/TNV2-A5AW (online auctions platform bringing together buyers and sellers of
counterfeit perfumes); Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier,
2010 E.C.R. I-2417, I-2467, available at https://perma.cc/6YR9-V2MT (AdWords, links to sites selling
infringing imitations of Vuitton bags).
32. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler) (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F.
33. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV (June 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J.
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the P2P network and to make unauthorized copies. 34 In both cases, the Court
distinguished between an act of communication to the public and “[t]he mere
provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication [which] does
not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Directive.”35 In
both cases, the decisions turned on the characterization of an act of communication,
all subsequent elements of a secondary communication to the public having been
established: that the communication was made to (1) a “public” composed of an
indeterminate but fairly large number of recipients; (2) a “new public” not taken into
account by the right owner when it initially communicated the work to the public
(defendants in both cases were facilitating access to infringing locations, thus the
right owner did not envision a “public” accessing the work from those locations);
and (3) defendants’ knowledge of the illicit character of the source of the
communication (websites in Filmspeler; “sharing” files of the P2P network’s
participants in Ziggo).
The “new public” criterion as applied in Svensson protected all those who
supplied links (of any kind, including framing links) to a site authorized by the
copyright owner, whom the Court deemed to have taken all Internet users into
account at the time of the first unrestricted posting of the work to the site. But, as
the Court recognized in Filmspeler, the notion of an accounted-for public makes no
sense when the source toward which the links point is illicit.36 Nonetheless, the risk
of finding a vast number of Internet users to be copyright infringers led the Court in
GS Media to seek a “fair balance” that enabled it to engraft onto the “new public”
requirement an additional criterion of knowledge that the linked-to content was
infringing.37 By contrast, in Filmspeler and Ziggo, by transposing the knowledge
criterion to the first stage of the analysis, in order to determine whether, as a result
of the “deliberate character of [its] intervention,”38 the defendant had committed an
act of communication in the first place, the Court achieved the balance sought in GS
Media. Inquiry into defendant’s deliberate intervention allowed the court to
distinguish the unconscious acts of simple Internet users, without requiring recourse
to the increasingly complex concept of a “new public” in order to avoid undesirable
consequences.
In Filmspeler the Court evoked the “essential role” of the person who effects an
act of communication, together with that person’s intentional intervention, in making

34. Ziggo concerned a request under art. 8 of the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29 to direct an access
provider to block access to The Pirate Bay website. Article 8, titled “Sanctions and remedies,” provides,
at ¶ 3: “Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.” Ziggo, as
an access provider, was an intermediary within the scope of art. 8, and its services were used by The Pirate
Bay, but it was necessary to establish that TPB was violating the right of communication to the public.
35. Directive 2001/29, supra note 22, at recital 27.
36. See Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 48 (“However, the same finding cannot be deduced from
those judgments failing such an authorisation.”).
37. See Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶¶ 44–48 (Sept. 8,
2016), https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6.
38. Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 26.
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a protected work accessible.39 But “essential” does not mean “indispensable.” In
fact, even if the purchasers of the Filmspeler set top box could have obtained
unauthorized access to the works by other means, the knowing facilitation of access
sufficed for the commission of an act of communication (as opposed to the simple
furnishing of the means to make a communication). The Court emphasized that the
defendant had loaded his media player with links to illicit sites “with full knowledge
of the consequences of his conduct.” 40 Because the pre-installed links, once
activated by the multimedia player’s users, “offer its users direct access to protected
works without the consent of the copyright holders,” the Court ruled that supplying
the device “must be regarded as an act of communication within the meaning of
Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”41
As for the “new public” criterion, after citing its decision in GS Media,42 the Court
simply observed: “In the present case, it is common ground that the sale of the
‘filmerspeler’ [sic] multimedia player was made in full knowledge of the fact that
the add-ons containing hyperlinks pre-installed on that player gave access to works
published illegally on the internet.”43

39. See Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 31 (“Amongst those criteria, the Court has emphasised,
above all, the essential role played by the user. The user makes an act of communication when he
intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of his action, to give access to a protected work to his
customers and does so, in particular, where, in the absence of that intervention, his customers would not,
in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast work (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 May 2016, Reha
Training, C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 46, and of 8 September 2016, GS Media, C-160/15,
EU:C:2016:644, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).”) (emphasis supplied).
40. See id. at ¶ 41 (“In the same way, it must be held that the present case does not concern a
situation of the ‘mere’ provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication. As the
Advocate General noted in paragraphs 53 and 54 of his opinion, Mr Wullems, with full knowledge of the
consequences of his conduct, pre-installs onto the ‘filmspeler’ multimedia player that he markets add-ons
that specifically enable purchasers to have access to protected works published—without the consent of
the copyright holders of those works—on streaming websites and enable those purchasers to watch those
works on their television screens (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 December 2006, SGAE, C-306/05,
EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 42). That intervention enabling a direct link to be established between
websites broadcasting counterfeit works and purchasers of the multimedia player, without which the
purchasers would find it difficult to benefit from those protected works, is quite different from the mere
provision of physical facilities, referred to in recital 27 of Directive 2001/29. In that regard, it is clear
from the observations presented to the Court that the streaming websites at issue in the main proceedings
are not readily identifiable by the public and the majority of them change frequently.”) (emphasis
supplied).
41. See id. at ¶ 42 (“Consequently, it must be held that the provision of a multimedia player such
as that at issue in the main proceedings enables, in view of the add-ons pre-installed on it, access via
structured menus to links that those add-ons which, when activated by the remote control of that
multimedia player, offer its users direct access to protected works without the consent of the copyright
holders and must be regarded as an act of communication within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive
2001/29.") (emphasis supplied).
42. See id. at ¶ 49.
43. Id. at ¶ 50. In the same paragraph, the Court also observes that Filmspeler’s conduct justified
the presumption of knowledge which, per GS Media, flows from the lucrative character of the link: “As
was noted in paragraph 18 above, the advertising of that multimedia player specifically stated that it made
it possible, in particular, to watch on a television screen, freely and easily, audiovisual material available
on the internet without the consent of the copyright holders.” Id.
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In Ziggo, the Court reinforced Filmspeler’s lesson: those who knowingly
facilitate unauthorized access to protected works play an “essential role” in their
communication, and therefore themselves commit an act of communication.44 As in
Filmspeler, the Court emphasized that TPB’s administrators “intervene, with full
knowledge of the consequences of their conduct, to provide access to protected
works.” TPB’s intervention consisted of “indexing on that platform torrent files
which allow users of the platform to locate those works and to share them within the
context of a peer-to-peer network.” The index “classif[ies] the works under different
categories, based on the type of the works, their genre or their popularity, within
which the works made available are divided, with the platform’s operators checking
to ensure that a work has been placed in the appropriate category. In addition, those
operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter some content.” By
classifying the works, TPB’s administrators must have been aware that protected
works were at issue, as the Court later pointed out.45 Without that intervention, “the
works could not be shared by the users or, at the very least, sharing them on the
internet would prove to be more complex.” Thus, to commit an act of
communication, it suffices to facilitate an access that nonetheless could otherwise,
albeit less easily, have been obtained.
As for the element of knowledge tied to the “new public” criterion, the Court
reiterated the facts that led it to reject the characterization of TPB as a mere furnisher

44. See Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶¶ 36–39 (June
14, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J (emphasis supplied):
[T]he fact remains that those operators, by making available and managing an online sharing
platform such as that at issue in the main proceedings, intervene, with full knowledge of the
consequences of their conduct, to provide access to protected works, by indexing on that platform
torrent files which allow users of the platform to locate those works and to share them within the
context of a peer-to-peer network. In this respect, as the Advocate General stated, in essence, in
point 50 of his Opinion, without the aforementioned operators making such a platform available
and managing it, the works could not be shared by the users or, at the very least, sharing them on
the internet would prove to be more complex.
The view must therefore be taken that the operators of the online sharing platform TPB, by making
that platform available and managing it, provide their users with access to the works concerned.
They can therefore be regarded as playing an essential role in making the works in question
available.
Finally, the operators of the online sharing platform TPB cannot be considered to be making a
‘mere provision’ of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication, within the
meaning of recital 27 of Directive 2001/29. It is clear from the order for reference that that
platform indexes torrent files in such a way that the works to which the torrent files refer may be
easily located and downloaded by the users of that sharing platform. Moreover, it is clear from
the observations submitted to the Court that, in addition to a search engine, the online sharing
platform TPB offers an index classifying the works under different categories, based on the type
of the works, their genre or their popularity, within which the works made available are divided,
with the platform’s operators checking to ensure that a work has been placed in the appropriate
category. In addition, those operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter some
content.
In the light of the foregoing, the making available and management of an online sharing platform,
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must be considered to be an act of communication
for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.
45. See id. at ¶ 45.
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of means. In fact, TPB’s administrators had been alerted that they were facilitating
access to infringing content. Far from purging its index, TPB instead incited its users
to make copies. Given that “a very large number of torrent files on the online sharing
platform TPB relate to works published without the consent of the rightholders,”
TPB “could not be unaware” that its platform was providing access to infringing
copies.46 Curiously, although TPB was a profit-seeking venture, the Court, albeit
generally observing that such a goal “is not irrelevant,”47 did not apply the rebuttable
presumption of knowledge announced in GS Media48 and reiterated in Filmspeler49
relative to those who furnish hyperlinks for profit-making purposes. Nonetheless, in
Ziggo, because it was so clear that TPB was acting in full knowledge of the illicit
nature of the communications that it was facilitating, there was no need to resort to a
presumption.
The analyses of knowledge with respect to facilitation of the act of
communication, and of knowledge respecting the “new public” criterion may differ
to some extent. On the one hand, the facts that led to characterizing TPB as engaging
in an act of communication (rather than simply supplying devices or services)
indicated that TPB knew with specificity which works were at issue (or at least
implied a level of knowledge allowing it to classify those works by category). On
the other hand, in the context of the “new public” criterion, the Court stressed that
TPB “could not have been unaware” of the infringing nature of the Torrent files; this
statement appears to require only a general knowledge of the infringing activities of
the P2P network’s participants.
The level of specificity of knowledge required to determine whether one who
facilitates an act of communication herself commits such an act is important. The
higher the level of specificity, the harder it will be to prove that the intermediary,
including a commercial actor, engages in an act of communication. Because the
question of “who commits” a copyright-implicating act comes at the outset of the
analysis, there will be no inquiry into the level of knowledge required for the
assessment of whether the communication was made to a “new public” if the court
finds the defendant not to have committed an act of communication in the first place.

46. See id. (“In the present case, it is apparent from the observations submitted to the Court, first,
that the operators of the online sharing platform TPB were informed that this platform, which they make
available to users and manage, provides access to works published without authorisation of the
rightholders and, second, that the same operators expressly display, on blogs and forums available on that
platform, their purpose to make protected works available to the users, and encourage the latter to make
copies of those works. In any event, it is clear from the order for reference that the operators of the online
sharing platform TPB could not be unaware that this platform provides access to works published without
the consent of the rightholders, given that, as expressly highlighted by the referring court, a very large
number of torrent files on the online sharing platform TPB relate to works published without the consent
of the rightholders. In those circumstances, it must be held that there is communication to a ‘new public’
(see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph
50).”) (emphasis supplied).
47. Id. at ¶ 29.
48. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶¶ 49–51 (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6.
49. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler), at ¶ 49 (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F.
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For example, it may be easier to prove that the facilitator of an infringing act
generally knew that the site toward which it was directing Internet users contained
infringing content, than to show that the facilitator knew precisely what works users
would find on the site. Moreover, a requirement of specific knowledge of particular
infringements invites avoidance of liability through automation, so that only the
“bot” and not the person who designed the bot would “know” to which works the
facilitator enables access. The Court’s statements in Ziggo regarding the level of
knowledge are inconsistent, as we have seen. Filmspeler, however, supports the
interpretation that a general knowledge of infringement will suffice, because the facts
evoked by the Court concern the illicit character of the sites toward which the links
directed the device’s users, without stating that the supplier of the device knew
specifically which films the linked-to sites offered.50
Ziggo did not concern hyperlinking but rather the furnishing of other means to
access infringing copies of works. One may therefore conclude that the Court has
generalized the analysis of who commits an act of communication beyond the context
of hyperlinks in order to establish harmonized norms of liability for facilitation of
infringement that result in the direct liability of the facilitator for violation of the
right of communication to the public. In other words, the Court has practically
harmonized the “very divergent solutions” to the doctrine of derivative liability
adopted by different E.U. member states, now ensuring that the standard applicable
to a claim of facilitation of infringement of the right of communication to the public
will be the same across all E.U. member states. 51 Indeed, in the context of the
facilitator of a violation of the right of communication to the public committed by
the initial infringer, a requirement of knowledge can clarify the “role of the user” and
thus allow the judge to determine when a facilitator should itself be held liable for
its own act of communication to the public. It is the facilitator’s “deliberate
intervention”52 for the purpose of making the infringing work more accessible to the
public that renders the intermediary liable for an illicit communication. By contrast,
when the facilitator has not taken an action “aimed directly at enabling purchasers to
access copyright-protected works on the internet without the consent of right
holders,”53 it has not played a “decisive role” in the illicit communication. Hence
the affirmation in Advocate General Szpunar’s conclusions in Ziggo that “the
decisive role in the communication to the public of a given work cannot be attributed
to [the defendant] if it is unaware that the work has been made available illegally.”54

50. See id. at ¶ 16 (“On that player, Mr Wullems installed an open source software, which makes
it possible to play files through a user-friendly interface via structured menus, and integrated into it,
without alteration, add-ons available on the internet, created by third parties, some of which specifically
link to websites on which protected works are made available to internet users without the consent of the
copyright holders.”).
51. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, in Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 3,
https://perma.cc/6WRF-JGG4.
52. GS Media, Case C-160/15, at ¶ 50; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 26.
53. See Opinion of Advocate General Sánchez Bordona, in Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 50,
https://perma.cc/V2ZT-U4NA.
54. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, in Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 51,
https://perma.cc/6WRF-JGG4.
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“Deliberate intervention” and “decisive role” imply an element of knowledge when
liability for an act of communication to the public is based on a re-communication
rather than on an initial illicit communication.55
One might object that this analysis appears to conflate a deliberate act with an
intention to promote copyright infringement. An intermediary might knowingly
decide to facilitate access to a work, or to a site containing works, without necessarily
knowing that the access is illicit. Nonetheless, in the case of access training on a
particular work, one can assume that if the work is a well-known film or recorded
musical composition, the facilitator will be able to recognize the title and realize that
it identifies a protected work whose availability on the target site was not
authorized.56 The same analysis pertains to a site containing many protected works.
By contrast, it would be more difficult to infer bad intent when the work or the
targeted site do not enjoy the same celebrity as the works at issue in Filmspeler and
Ziggo.
In light of this case law, it is appropriate to synthesize the harmonized criteria that
undergird a violation of the right of communication to the public. We will distinguish
criteria applicable to any communication, initial as well as by retransmission or
facilitation, from criteria applicable to retransmissions or facilitations of access to an
initial communication.
1. Criteria Applicable to All Communications to the Public by Making
Available
There must be an act of communication, including by making available (offering
access to works): “it is sufficient, in particular, that a work is made available to a
public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective
of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity.”57
That act of communication must be made to the public: “the concept of the
‘public’ refers to an indeterminate number of potential viewers and implies,
moreover, a fairly large number of people.”58
The commercial nature of the communication may be taken into account: “the
profit-making nature of a communication, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of
Directive 2001/29, is not irrelevant.”59 Indeed, one may assume that one who seeks

55. The Court should in fact have been inquiring into whether three was a new communication
(when it is made by one who did not make the initial communication), rather than whether there is a new
public. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 11bis; ALAI New Public Opinion, supra note 15.
56. Cf. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2016)
(concluding that a reasonable jury could find that sharing platform should have been aware that there were
no authorized MP3 files either of recordings from major labels issued before 2007, or of any songs by the
Beatles).
57. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2014 E.C.R. 1, at ¶ 19 (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE.
58. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler), at ¶ 32 (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F.
59. Id. at ¶ 34; Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶ 29 (June
14, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J.
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economic benefit from an act of communication will not limit the intended recipients
to a sole circle of family and social acquaintance.
2. Criteria Specific to the Intermediaries Who Facilitate Unauthorized Access
to Works by Hyperlinking or Other Means
The “essential,” “decisive,” or “deliberate” role of the intermediary, 60 “in full
knowledge of the consequences of his action”—that is, knowing that it is facilitating
infringement61—is what distinguishes the commission of an act of communication
from the simple supplying of means. This role may be performed by one whose
intervention makes works more easily accessible, even when members of the public
might have obtained access by other means.62
3. Is the “New Public” Still a Relevant Criterion?
When an intermediary, through the same means of communication (e.g., the
Internet), facilitates access to a work from a legal source to which the public has
unrestricted access, application of the “new public” criterion will preclude the
characterization of the intervention as an act of communication.63
By contrast, this criterion does not apply if the intermediary employs a different
technical means of communication,64 even if the initial source of the communication
is lawful.65
The application of the “new public” criterion in Svensson assumes that the source
to which access is facilitated is legal66 or that the intermediary is not circumventing
an access restriction applied by the source website.67
The illegality of the source does not, however, necessarily result in rejecting the
“new public” criterion, but instead adds to that criterion a further consideration: the
intermediary’s knowledge of the illegality of the source. 68 This knowledge is
presumed when the intermediary acts with a profit motive.69
60. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 49; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 26.
61. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 31; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶¶ 26, 34.
62. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 41; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 36.
63. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2014 E.C.R. 1, at ¶¶ 24–28 (Feb. 13, 2014)
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE.
64. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶ 37 (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6.
65. Case C-607/11, ITV Broadcasting v. TVCatchUp, 2013 E.C.R. 1, at ¶ 39 (Mar. 7, 2013),
https://perma.cc/AL2Q-NXCQ.
66. GS Media, Case C-160/15, at ¶ 43.
67. Id. at ¶ 50.
68. Id. at ¶¶ 44–49.
69. Id. at ¶ 51. See also Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler), at
¶¶ 49, 51. Recently, German courts have declined to extend this rebuttable presumption to search engines,
even though they presumably provide links with a profit motive. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 21, 2017, I ZR 11/16; LG Hamburg [Regional Court of Hamburg] June
13, 2017, 310 O 117/17. This approach, which creates considerable tension with the authoritative
language in GS Media, will be welcomed by some commentators who have argued that the presumption
of knowledge should be “cautiously adapted for different key internet actors, such as search engines
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But in order for the person who facilitates access to a communication initially
emanating from an illegal source to be considered to have committed an act of
communication (rather than a simple furnishing of means) in his own right, he must
have acted “in full knowledge of the consequences of his action.”70 But knowledge
of the illicit activity that characterizes the “new public” under GS Media will already
have been taken into account at the first stage of the analysis, according to Filmspeler
and Ziggo. Hence the doubts about the pertinence of the “new public” criterion in
the case of intermediaries who furnish unauthorized access to works.71
B. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS
If the “new public” criterion is receding into redundancy or irrelevance, the
tension between E.U. case law and the international norms of the Berne Convention
and WIPO Copyright Treaties should diminish as well. The treaties supply no basis
for the criterion; the closest text is Berne art. 11bis(2)(ii), which addresses secondary
transmissions of broadcasts “made by an organization other than the original one.”72
In other words, the “new” entity is not the receiving public, but the person engaging
in the subsequent transmission. Once it is clear that the treaty contemplates not a
different public, but a different provider of the communication, it should be apparent
that providers of hyperlinks that render works (or more precisely under article
11bis(2), broadcasts of works) accessible to members of the public come within the
scope of the right of communication to the public.
The CJEU’s other innovations in defining a communication to the public by
“making available” warrant comparison with our analysis of hyperlinking under
WCT article 8. We have suggested that the supplier of a hyperlink may be making
a work available for individualized access if the link communicates the work directly
to the user, rather than taking the user to another site from which the user may
navigate her way to the work.73 In other words, deep links and framing links will
make works available, while simple links will not (simple links make available the
site from which the work is offered). Deep and framing links come within the
making available right because the sites on which these links are found are the sites
from which the user chooses to access the work; because the user will not experience
the access as emanating from a third-party site, she cannot have chosen to request a
communication of the work from an unknown location. The CJEU has declined to

(which as a service aggregating massive amounts of content in an automated way would only have to
show minimal general precautions to rebut the assumption), different aggregators (which would also only
have to show minimal reasonable precautions to rebut the assumption), or persons posting individual links
(which might be subject to more intensive duties of care . . . ).” See Leistner, supra note 27, at 331.
70. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 31.
71. Some commentators offer an even harsher judgment of the “new public” criterion after GS
Media. See, e.g., Pekka Savola, EU Copyright Liability for Internet Linking, J. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
INFORMATION TECH. & E-COMMERCE L, 2017 at ¶ 18 (calling the criterion an “unnecessary doctrinal
misstep”); see also supra note 27.
72. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 11bis(1)(ii).
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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distinguish simple links from deep and framing links,74 but its requirement that the
linker play an “essential,” “decisive,” or “deliberate” role in making the work
available, “in full knowledge of the consequences of his action” may in practice
extend only to those linkers whose intervention delivers the work directly to the user.
Our proposed WCT analysis has focused on the choice of the user, while the CJEU
approach examines the conduct of the linker, but the two inquiries can be reconciled:
the linker’s “deliberate intervention” to enhance individual access to the works
makes it possible for the user to choose to access the work from the linker’s site.
Without a given linker’s offer of access to the work, a user seeking to stream or
download that content would choose another provider’s “place” from which to access
the work.
It is now appropriate to consider the relationship between the harmonized
European law of the liability of facilitators of access to illicit works or sources, and
the harmonized European law of the non-liability of facilitators of unauthorized
access established by the E.U. eCommerce Directive 2000/31.75
C. FILMSPELER AND ZIGGO: THE FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN OF ART. 14 OF THE
ECOMMERCE DIRECTIVE?
While the European law of liability for facilitation of infringement by enabling
access to third-party infringing communications was not harmonized before
Filmspeler and Ziggo, the same is not true of the criteria for non-liability of certain
intermediaries who facilitate access to third-party infringements. Article 14 of the
eCommerce Directive 2000/31 provides a safe harbor from liability for certain
“information society services.”76 When the intermediary provides a service “that
consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service . . . the
service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient
of the service” provided that: “(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of
illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent. . .
.”77 As a threshold matter, it is not immediately clear that providers of hyperlinks
qualify in the first place for the art. 14 non-liability provision. While some search
engine activities (specifically, advertising services provided by search engine

74. See Case C-348/13, BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://perma.cc/B2QN-99AF.
75. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market,
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter Directive 2000/31]. For a different view of the relationship between the
CJEU’s recent caselaw and the eCommerce Directive, see Eleonora Rosati, The CJEU Pirate Bay
Judgment and Its Impact on the Liability of Online Platforms, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 737 (2017).
76. Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art. 14.
77. Id. These conditions of non-liability do not include an obligation “actively” to seek out
infringing content. On the contrary, according to art. 15, “Member States shall not impose a general
obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances
indicating illegal activity.” Id. art. 15.
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companies78) might qualify under art. 14, it does not follow that the provision of
links by either a search engine or an individual actor corresponds to the criteria of
art. 14.79 Providers of hyperlinks do not necessarily “stor[e] information provided
by a recipient of the service.” Rather, in many hyperlinking contexts, the hyperlinks
at issue will have been provided by the operator of the website (for example, search
engines will themselves find and index links to websites on the Internet, or a blogger
might provide a link to another website when curating the content on her website).
E.U. member state authorities and commentators appear to agree that the safe
harbor provisions of the eCommerce Directive do not cover information location
tools like search engines or hyperlinks, but that E.U. member states are free to create
additional safe harbors through national law for search engines or hyperlink
providers. 80 While the parallel safe harbor legislation in the United States (the
78. In Google France v. Louis Vuitton, the CJEU applied the art. 14 immunity provision to
Google’s AdWords product, which allows advertisers to display their advertisements in a “sponsored
links” section of Google’s search results when internet users search for particular keywords. See Joined
Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, I-2467,
available at https://perma.cc/6YR9-V2MT. The CJEU ultimately held Google to be within the scope of
non-liability provision of art. 14, but this decision rested in part on the observation that Google stored not
only links, but “the keywords selected by the advertiser” and “the accompanying commercial message”
that allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s trademarks. Id. a ¶ 111. Although Google may have suggested the
keywords its customers selected, formally at least, the keyword links were “provided by a recipient of the
service” and thus qualified under the language of art. 14 of the eCommerce Directive. Google’s search
engine (in contrast to its advertising service) may in fact involve the storage of much less—a search engine
need only store a link to an indexed webpage, and such a link may not be “provided by a recipient of the
service,” but instead created through Google’s web crawler technology. Similarly, the provider of an
individual link by an actor who is not a search engine may not store anything other than a simple URL
address, which the website creator (rather than a “recipient of the service”) provided.
79. The German Federal Supreme Court has noted, in dicta, that a search engine may be liable for
copyright infringement only once it had obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature of the data it had
stored and then did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that data—mirroring the
language of the eCommerce Directive. See Vorschaubilder I [Google Image Search], Bundesgerichtshof
[Federal Court of Justice], I ZR 69/08 (2010). See also Birgit Clark, Google Image Search Does Not
Infringe Copyright, says Bundesgerichtshof, 5 J. Iɴᴛᴇʟʟ. Pʀᴏᴘ. L. & Pʀᴀᴄ. 553 (2010) (noting that this
decision implies that search engines could claim safe harbor under the eCommerce Directive).
80. First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, COM (2003) 702 final (Nov. 21, 2003), at 13 (Nov. 21,
2003), https://perma.cc/Z6PG-AMDF [hereinafter First Report] (“Whilst it was not considered necessary
to cover hyperlinks and search engines in the Directive, the Commission has encouraged Member States
to further develop legal security for internet intermediaries.”); Id. at 13 n.69 (noting that Spain and
Portugal have “opted for the model of Article 14 [“hosting” safe harbor] both for search engines and
hyperlinks” and that Austria and Lichtenstein have “opted for the model of Article 12 [“mere conduit”
safe harbor] for search engines and of Article 14 [“hosting” safe harbor] for hyperlinks”). For example,
the Austrian E-Commerce Act provides safe harbor for “[a] service provider which provides users with a
search engine or other electronic aids to search for third-party information” and “[a] service provider
which provides access to third-party information by means of an electronic link.” See Federal Act
Governing Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commercial and Legal Transactions (E-Commerce Act –
ECG), Jan. 1 2002, https://perma.cc/2LXQ-SB9P. See also First Report, for an overview of the additional
safe harbor regimes applicable to search engines or linkers implemented in Austria, Hungary, Spain, and
Portugal. French courts appear to have achieved a similar result. See SAIF v. Google, Cour d’appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Jan. 26, 2011, 08/13423, https://perma.cc/U9SW-55PA (holding
Google Image Search to be a mere neutral provider of tools—links—employed by users, and holding that
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DMCA, which was passed two years before the passage of the eCommerce
directive81) does provide a specific safe harbor for “information location tools,” the
eCommerce Directive neglects to provide such a safe harbor.82 The eCommerce
Directive does, however, require the submission of a report to “analyse the need for
proposals concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool
services.”83
Once past the question whether the eCommerce Directive applies at all to linking
activities, one will recognize a certain parallelism between the conditions for a
violation of the right of communication to the public by facilitation, and those of the
non-liability of service providers covered by the eCommerce Directive. In both
cases, the lack of knowledge of the illicit activity excludes liability. But the Directive
sets out only the conditions of non-liability; it was up to the E.U. member States to
draw the negative inference, and to decide whether (or not) effective knowledge
resulted in the liability of those who facilitate access to infringing content. The CJEU
has now filled this gap by taking on the task of assessing the liability of facilitators,
not only for “information society services” covered by the Directive, but also for any
Internet intermediary.
By putting the facilitator’s knowledge up front in the analysis, the Court has
procedurally anticipated the criteria of the eCommerce Directive, but has also
extended them to intermediaries who do not qualify to invoke the Directive. For
example, Filmspeler would not be an “information society service” because it was
selling physical devices (set top boxes). And even if it could have been considered
a service provider, the links it loaded onto the media player were not “information
stored at the request of a recipient of the service,” that is, by Filmspeler’s customers,
but were furnished by the service itself. Nonetheless, its liability will depend on the
assessment of its level of knowledge, just as its non-liability would have depended
on the same assessment if it had qualified for the immunity established by the
eCommerce Directive. Similarly, the liability of a hyperlink provider, who does not
“stor[e]” “information . . . at the request of a recipient of [its] service” and thus may
be ineligible for the art. 14 safe harbor, may depend on the same assessment of the
provider’s level of knowledge.
There is one difference in the analyses regarding the placement of the burden of
proof. Because art. 14 of the eCommerce Directive limits the service provider’s
liability, the beneficiary of the limitation should bear the burden of proving
compliance with its conditions. By contrast, when the question of knowledge
becomes part of the case in chief, the right holder bears the burden of establishing
every element of the claim, including that the defendant acted with knowledge that
it was facilitating infringement. That said, the rebuttable presumption that the Court

the mere fact that Google was “aware that [its] automatic indexing is likely to infringe on copyrighted
works is not sufficient to engage its liability insofar as the services are ready to de-index upon
notification”).
81. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1998).
82. See First Report, supra note 80, at 13 (noting that coverage of hyperlinks and search engines
“was not considered necessary” when drafting the eCommerce Directive).
83. Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art. 21(2).
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imposed on commercial actors in the context of the “new public” analysis in GS
Media could also apply to the analysis of the deliberate intervention of the
intermediary in the commission of an act of communication. In that case, profitseeking defendants will be required to prove their lack of knowledge. As a result,
commercial actors will receive the same treatment under the analysis of liability for
facilitation of infringing communications as under the analysis of non-liability of
“information society services” covered by the eCommerce Directive.
Given the debate in the E.U. over whether art. 14 of the eCommerce Directive has
resulted in a “value gap” that allows service providers, such as YouTube, to benefit
from the commercial value of works of authorship without paying the right holders,
one might inquire whether the effective transposition of the non-liability criteria from
art. 14 to the analysis of the reach of the right of communication to the public under
art. 3 of the InfoSoc Directive will further weaken that right. 84 But basing the
liability of facilitators of infringement on the concept of knowledge derived from art.
14 could in fact increase the predictability of the analysis of that liability. Indeed,
looking at the facts in Filmspeler and Ziggo in the light of art. 14 and the CJEU’s
case law interpreting the eCommerce directive, notably in Google France v. Vuitton,
C-236/08 to C-238/08 (2008), and L’Oréal v. eBay, C-324/09 (2011), the same
results would obtain, but with additional elements available to evaluate the
defendants’ knowledge.85
Google France and L’Oréal were trademark infringement cases involving in the
first case the AdWords service, and in the second an online auction platform.
Because the eCommerce Directive is transversal, the CJEU’s case law on (non)
liability for trademark infringement illuminates (non) liability for copyright
infringement as well. In both cases, the courts assessed whether the service played
“an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data
stored.”86 The notion of “an active role” resembles the “deliberate intervention” that
characterizes the commission of an act of communication by facilitation. By
contrast, if “the role played by that service is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is
merely technical, automatic and passive,” that neutrality indicates “a lack of
knowledge or control of the data which it stores.”87 In applying these considerations
to Ziggo and Filmspeler, it becomes clear that the contributions of these actors were
far from “neutral.” For example, the Court pointed out that the administrators of The
Pirate Bay “expressly display, on blogs and forums available on that platform, their
purpose to make protected works available to the users, and encourage the latter to
make copies of those works.”88
84. See, e.g., 2016 Proposal, supra note 31; ALAI, Resolution on the European proposals of 14
September 2016 to introduce fairer sharing of the value when works and other protected material are
made available by electronic means (Feb. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/LBY5-4638.
85. See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 2010 E.C.R.
I-2417, I-2467, available at https://perma.cc/6YR9-V2MT; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay International,
2011 E.C.R. I-6011, I-6073, available at https://perma.cc/TNV2-A5AW.
86. Google France, 2010 E.C.R. at ¶ 120; L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. at ¶ 113.
87. Google France, 2010 E.C.R. at ¶ 114.
88. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶ 45 (June 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J. The administrators had also “indexe[d] torrent files in such a way that the
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The neutrality required by the eCommerce Directive art. 14 case law resembles
the notion of “making a mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making
a communication” that characterizes an act that will not be considered an act of
communication under the case law on liability for facilitation of infringement of the
right of communication to the public. Thus, in Filmspeler, the Court detailed the
acts of the defendant that constituted “communications.” The device allowed “a
direct link to be established between websites broadcasting counterfeit works and
purchasers of the multimedia player, without which the purchasers would find it
difficult to benefit from those protected works, [this] is quite different from the mere
provision of physical facilities.”89 In other words, Filmspeler “optimized” access to
infringing content; that optimization, like the promotion of unlawful access, is an act
whose lack of neutrality the Court emphasized in its eCommerce Directive case
law.90
One should also recall that, according to art. 14, the knowledge that precludes
immunity from liability is not only specific knowledge of the unlawful activity but
also “knowledge of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity or
information is apparent.” The latter type of knowledge appears to correspond to the
knowledge attributed to the administrators of The Pirate Bay: given that “a very
large number of torrent files on the online sharing platform TPB relate to works
published without the consent of the rightholders,” they “could not be unaware”91
that the files were infringing.
One might object that the symmetry between liability for facilitation of illicit
communications and the Court’s interpretation of the art. 14 eCommerce Directive
criteria is imperfect because the former presumes the knowledge of commercial
actors, while no similar presumptions accompany art. 14. Once might buttress the
objection with the observation that one of the objectives of the eCommerce Directive
was to protect “information society services” from liability for their users’ unlawful
acts, even though many of those services operate for profit.92 But the critique is illfounded. It overlooks the role of a rebuttable presumption of knowledge, which
reverses the burden of proof and requires the commercial defendant to prove that it
acted without knowledge of ensuing infringements. Moreover, because art. 14
derogates from the liability the services could otherwise incur, the services should
bear the burden of conforming their conduct to the prerequisites for qualifying for

works to which the torrent files refer may be easily located and downloaded by the users of that sharing
platform” with the goal of aiding users to find the files. Id. at ¶ 38. Compare L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. at ¶
116 (“Where, by contrast, the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the
presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to have
taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers but to have played an
active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data relating to those offers for
sale. It cannot then rely, in the case of those data, on the exemption from liability referred to in Article
14(1) of Directive 2000/31.”).
89. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler), at ¶ 41 (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F.
90. See L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. at ¶ 116.
91. See Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 45.
92. See, e.g., Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at recital 2.
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the liability limitation. To the extent there is a disparity in treatment between the
showing of an infringement case-in-chief, and the showing required to claim the
immunity from liability, it favors non-commercial actors, for to establish their
liability for infringement of the right of communication to the public, the right holder
will need to prove their knowledge of the illicit character of the source to which they
facilitate access. By contrast, had art. 14 applied, the service, whether or not forprofit, would have to prove its lack of knowledge. Because art. 14 limits providers’
liability, its analysis comes after the prima facie case.93 If at the outset the absence
of a presumption of knowledge would lead a court to decline to rule that a noncommercial defendant violated the right of communication to the public, then the
court will never get to the question of whether the defendant satisfied the criteria for
application of the eCommerce Directive’s criteria.94
III. U.S. LAW ON LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING
A. DIRECT LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Statutory Basis for Copyright Coverage of Hyperlinks
The author’s exclusive rights under the U.S. Copyright Act expressly include
neither a “making available” right, nor a right of “communication to the public.” The
closest statutory analog to those rights in the context of hyperlinking is the right to
display or perform a work publicly by transmission or other means of communication
under § 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 95 Section 101 of that act defines “[t]o
perform or display a work ‘publicly’” as:
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.96

The definition section also specifies that “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance or display is
to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received
beyond the place from which they are sent.” 97 The statutory language is
technologically neutral, on its face encompassing all means of direct and secondary
93. Although art. 14 eCommerce Directive states that “the service provider is not liable for the
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service,” the service provider remains subject to
injunctive relief under art. 8.3 Directive 2001/29, which provides that right holders may obtain an
“injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or
related right.” Compare Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art. 14, with Directive 2001/29, supra note 22,
at art. 8.
94. We will consider the compatibility with international norms of the eCommerce Directive’s
liability limitations for service providers after we address the parallel regime in the U.S. under section 512
of the Copyright Act. See infra Part III.C.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
96. Id. at § 101. Section 101 also defines the term “to transmit” as “to communicate it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” Id.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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U.S. case law on

2. The Server Rule and Perfect 10 v. Amazon
In the U.S., a judge-made doctrine known as the “server test” or “server rule”
governs the treatment of hyperlinks under the Copyright Act.98 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit adopted the test in a 2007 case, Perfect 10 v. Amazon, and
several U.S. courts since then have followed it.99 Under the “server rule,” “the owner
of a computer that does not store and serve . . . electronic information to a user is not
displaying [or distributing] that information, even if such owner in-line links to or
frames the electronic information.” 100 Therefore, a defendant who provides a
hyperlink of any kind (through simple linking, deep linking, framing, or in-line
linking101) cannot incur direct copyright liability unless that defendant also “store[s]
and serve[s]” the copyrighted material to which the link points.
In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, a copyright holder sued Google for copyright
infringement, alleging that Google infringed its copyrighted images by (1) storing
“thumbnail” copies of those images on Google servers, which were then presented
to Google Image Search users in a list of search results, and (2) presenting Google
Image Search users with full-size versions of the images when those users clicked on
a thumbnail image presented in the search results.102 Google conceded that it had
created and displayed the “thumbnail” copies of the images in question, and argued
(successfully) that the creation of thumbnail images to enable users to easily search
for images constituted fair use.103 However, as the lower court noted, there was a
98. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
99. See id.; see also MyPlayCity, Inc. v. Conduit Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 1615(CM), 2012 WL 1107648,
at *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that “merely providing a ‘link’ to a site containing
copyrighted material does not constitute direct infringement of the holder’s distribution right”). Four
available cases directly conflict with the “server test.” See Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network,
LLC, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 21-24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (expressly declining to follow
Perfect 10 and arguing that the “server test” is not “adequately grounded in the text of the Copyright Act”);
The Leader’s Institute, LLC v. Robert Jackson, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 WL 5629514, *10 (N.D.
Tex. 2017) (expressly declining to follow Perfect 10 and instead holding that “by framing the defendants’
copyrighted works, the plaintiffs impermissibly displayed the works to the public”); Flava Works, Inc. v.
Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 3876910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011), vacated, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir.
2012) (“To the extent that Perfect 10 can be read to stand for the proposition that inline linking can never
cause a display of images or videos that would give rise to a claim of direct copyright infringement, we
respectfully disagree.”); Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL 79311,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding that a defendant may have infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by
framing media available on the plaintiff’s website) (note that Live Nation Motor Sports was decided a six
months before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Amazon).
100. Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843–45 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
101. For clarity, this Article employs the term “in-line linking” to refer to both in-line linking and
framing. See supra note 1.
102. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1155–56.
103. Id. at 1165 (noting that while “an image may have been created originally to serve an
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms the image into a pointer
directing a user to a source of information” and thus “provides an entirely new use for the original work”
which constitutes permissible fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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fundamental distinction between the presentation of Google’s “thumbnail” image
copies (which were actually stored on Google servers) and the presentation of the
full-sized images, which were not stored on Google servers but were instead served
up to users through “framed” or “in-line” links which directed the users’ browsers to
the server on which the images originally appeared, albeit while in-lining the
destination site with information from the linking site.104
The lower court had adopted an interpretation of the Copyright Act under which
Google would be found directly liable only for displaying and distributing the images
it stored on its own servers, based on the “server test” whose adoption Google
urged. 105 On appeal, Perfect 10 countered by pointing out that “[f]rom a user’s
perspective, viewing material within a ‘frame’ while on google.com is no different
from viewing material stored on Google’s own server.”106 The Ninth Circuit rejected
Perfect 10’s position and endorsed the lower court’s logic. The Ninth Circuit
contended that a link is, essentially “HTML instructions [constituting mere] lines of
text,” and that “[p]roviding these HTML instructions is not equivalent to showing a
copy.”107 According to the court, “it is the [source] website publisher’s computer
that distributes [and displays] copies of the images by transmitting the photographic
image electronically to the user’s computer,” and Google’s HTML instructions “do
not themselves cause infringing images to appear on the user’s computer screen.”108
Perfect 10 essentially precluded the argument that, under U.S. law, the provision
of a link could constitute an act of direct infringement, even if a website’s act of
linking is done in a way that might “cause some computer users to believe they are
viewing a single . . . webpage” rather than a link to a source website.109 Since 2007,
U.S. courts have held that the “server test” bars any finding of direct copyright

104. Id. at 1161 (noting that when displaying the full-sized images, Google simply “provides HTML
instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s computer that stores the full-size
photographic image”).
105. Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 843–45. The lower court’s adoption of the “server
test” was based partially on an analysis of relevant precedent which implied that direct infringement in
the internet context required that the defendant “use its hardware to either store the infringing images or
move them from one location to another for display.” See id. at 840–43 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1168–69 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). The lower court also relied
on other cases holding that hyperlinking does not necessarily constitute direct infringement of the
reproduction or distribution rights. See id. at 842 (citing Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV
99-7643, 2000 WL 525390, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), which held that “hyperlinking does not itself
involve a violation of the Copyright Act . . . since no copying is involved,” and Arista Records, Inc. v.
MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660, 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002), which held that
linking to content does not implicate the distribution right).
106. Third Brief on Cross-Appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Perfect 10, Inc., Perfect 10
v. Google, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-55406), 2006 WL 3023532, at section I.C.
107. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161.
108. Id. at 1161–62.
109. Id. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE
UNITED STATES 49 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/2DPW-HWVF (“The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
in Perfect 10 has been relied on to bar direct infringement claims for instances of inline linking and
framing.”).
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liability for simple linking, 110 deep linking 111 or in-line linking. 112 U.S. courts
instead characterize the provision of hyperlinks of any form as the facilitation of a
user’s access to infringing works, which “raises only [secondary] liability issues.”113
3. Analysis of the Server Rule
a. The Server Rule, Statutory Authority and Misplaced Metaphors
The natural implication of the “server rule” is that the mere provision of a
hyperlink of any kind cannot constitute an act of public performance or display and
therefore cannot constitute a direct violation of the exclusive rights reserved to
copyright holders under § 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 114 Thus, despite the
breadth and technological neutrality of those rights, the server rule effectively
assumes that a hyperlink is not a “device or process” that “transmit[s] or otherwise
communicate[s] a performance or display of a work . . . to the public.”115 This logic
relies on a restrictive definition of “transmit or otherwise communicate,” which it
reads to include only those “device[s] or process[es]” which “cause infringing
images to appear on the user’s screen,” by pushing data from the server on which the
work is stored to the user’s browser.116 The statutory definition of “to transmit,”
however, is not so constrained. The statutory language includes within the definition
of “transmit” “any . . . process . . . whereby images or sounds are received beyond
the place from which they are sent.” 117 The legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to broaden the definition of public performances and displays to
cover “not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which
that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public.” 118 The
“process . . . whereby images . . . are received” on a user’s screen certainly includes
110. See, e.g., Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 963 F. Supp. 2d 239, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
that a defendant who provided a link to its customers to a file sharing site which allowed for the download
of an infringing copy of plaintiff’s work did not commit an act of direct infringement, noting that “sending
an email containing a hyperlink to a site facilitating the sale of a copyrighted work does not itself constitute
copyright infringement”).
111. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99–7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL
525390, at *2 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 27, 2000) (noting that the defendant’s deep linking to event pages on the
Ticketmaster website did not constitute infringement because “hyperlinking does not itself involve a
violation of the Copyright Act . . . since no copying is involved” and because “[t]he customer is
automatically transferred to the particular genuine web page of the original author. . . [t]his is analogous
to using a library’s card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more efficiently”).
112. See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1159; MyPlayCity, Inc. v. Conduit Ltd., No. 10
Civ. 1615(CM), 2012 WL 1107648, at *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that an online platform
which provided toolbars which incorporated in-line links to plaintiff’s copyrighted games did not commit
an act of direct infringement when it in-line linked to plaintiff’s games without permission, noting that
“merely providing a ‘link’ to a site containing copyrighted material does not constitute direct infringement
of a holder’s distribution right”).
113. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
116. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis supplied).
118. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976).
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the hyperlinks and HTML code which cause that image to appear. Even under a
strictly technical approach, the process through which a user’s browser displays a
webpage begins not when the host server sends data to the user’s browser, but when
the clicked hyperlink instructs the user’s browser to retrieve the data from the source
server and provides the browser with the relevant URL address. As the Ninth Circuit
explained: the hyperlink “gives the address of the image to the user’s browser. The
browser then interacts with the [server, which] causes an . . . image to appear on the
user’s computer screen.”119 The fundamental assumption underlying the server rule
is that the first part of this process, which enables the browser to connect with the
right server, is not part of the “process” at all. By contrast, in a recent decision, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected this logic, noting that
when a website “paste[s] a code line into its blog/article that contains” HTML
instructions to “embed” an image from a different website into its page, that website
“[takes] active steps to put a process in place that resulted in a transmission of the
[linked-to work] so that they could be visibly shown.” 120 These “active steps,”
according to the court, “constitute a process” and the “plain language of the
Copyright Act calls for no more” to establish an act of direct infringement.121
Similarly, the inclusion of a catch-all category in the statutory definition
(“transmit or otherwise communicate”) indicates that the definition should be read
broadly, not narrowly.122 The drafters of the bill intended the scope of the display
right to be broad enough to include “[e]ach and every method by which the images .
. . comprising a . . . display are picked up and conveyed” and “any act by which [an]
initial performance or display is transmitted, repeated, or made to recur,” including
“any type of electronic retrieval system.”123
In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit provided an additional basis for its adoption of the
server rule: it invented a requirement that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the public
display right must prove that the defendant had possession of a copy of the
copyrighted work.124 In the court’s words, a defendant who “does not have a copy
[of the work] . . . . cannot communicate a copy” through a public display.125 The
court thus concluded that a defendant who supplies any type of link cannot publicly
display the linked-to work, because such a defendant lacks possession of a tangible
copy of the work.126 However, the Copyright Act strongly suggests that a person
may commit an act of infringing public display or performance without possession
of a copy of the work. The Copyright Act defines “display” as “to show a copy of it,
either directly or by means of film, slide, television image, or any other device or

119. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161.
120. Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC., Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 18-19
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018).
121. Id. at 19.
122. Id. at 17-18 (noting that the definitions of “to perform or display a work ‘publicly’” and “to
‘transmit’” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 are “plainly drafted with the intent to sweep broadly”).
123. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63–64.
124. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61.
125. Id.
126. Id.

GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018)

2018]

LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT

181

process,”127 and nowhere indicates that to “show a copy” requires possession of that
copy. It seems evident that a person may “show a copy” even if the copy “belongs
to someone else”128—in the words of one recent opinion, “a person that went into a
movie theater and used a video camera connected to the internet to broadcast a movie
to the public would clearly be committing copyright infringement even though the
person did not herself have a copy of the movie.”129 Moreover, other provisions of
the Copyright Act which provide exceptions to the exclusive rights laid out in 17
U.S.C. § 106 clearly imply that a party may commit an act of public display or
performance without having possession of a copy of the work.130 Several courts have
noted this flaw in the reasoning underlying the server rule.131
In devising its “possession of a copy” requirement, the Ninth Circuit overlooked
the difference between the two separate clauses which define “to perform or display
a work ‘publicly’” under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines this phrase to
mean:

127. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
128. See Lee Burgunder & Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline Web Designing After Perfect 10, 17
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 16 (2008) (“[T]he Copyright Act makes it unlawful merely to display a copy
of a copyrighted work. Thus, the copy could be one that belongs to someone else; it does not have to be a
copy that the individual, in fact, owns. This means that if one had a device that could transmit an image
from one place to another, this person could display someone else’s work in a separate location simply by
pointing the device at that other individual’s copyrighted image. Certainly, this would effectuate a public
display under the terms of the Copyright Act, despite the fact that this person does not own or possess a
personal copy of the work.”).
129. The Leader’s Institute, LLC v. Robert Jackson, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 WL 5629514,
*11 (N.D. Tex. 2017). See also Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC., Civ. No. 1:17-cv03144-KBF at 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (“[T]his court sees nothing in the text or purpose of the
Copyright Act suggesting that physical possession of an image is a necessary element to its display for
purposes of the Act.”); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp.
2d 627, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that defendants had “accessed archived screenshots of [plaintiff’s]
website via the Wayback Machine, and the images were displayed on their computers” and that “the
display of copyrighted images on computers in an office constitutes a public display.”).
130. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (providing that “communication of a transmission embodying a
performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes” “are not infringements of copyright” unless “(i) a
direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or (ii) the transmission thus received is further
transmitted to the public”). This language implies that, but for this provision, the reception of a broadcast
transmission of a copyrighted work on a public television or radio receiver (i.e. in a restaurant or hotel
lobby) would constitute a public display or performance, even though the operator of the receiver may not
possess a copy of the work. See Goldman v. Breitbart News, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 22 (noting
that the § 110(5) exemption “is strong evidence that a copy need not be made in order to display an
image”).
131. See, e.g., Leader’s Institute, 2017 WL 5629514 at *10 (“[T]o the extent Perfect 10 makes actual
possession of a copy a necessary condition to violating a copyright owner’s exclusive right to display her
copyrighted works, the Court respectfully disagrees with the Ninth Circuit . . . The text of the Copyright
Act does not make actual possession of a copy of a work a prerequisite for infringement. To display a
work, someone need only show a copy of the work; a person need not actually possess a copy to display
a work.”); Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 3876910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011),
vacated, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In our view, a website’s servers need not actually store a copy of
a work in order to ‘display’ it.”).
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(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.132

While a public performance or display of a work in a place open to the public
(clause (1)) may imply at least the temporary possession of a source copy for the
performance or display, 133 reading such a prerequisite into the “transmit” clause
(clause (2)) may unduly limit the reach of this definition, which neither requires nor
implies that the person committing the performance or display must possess a copy
of the work. 134 The House Report accompanying the § 101 definition of the
“transmit” clause listed several examples of “transmissions” covered by the clause;
many of these involve transmissions by actors who would not typically possess a
copy of the work that is the object of the communication:
[T]he concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the initial
rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is
transmitted or communicated to the public. Thus, for example . . . a local broadcaster is
performing when it transmits [a] network broadcast; a cable television system is
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is
performing whenever he or she . . . communicates [a] performance by turning on a
receiving set.135

In support of the server test, U.S. courts typically downplay the role of hyperlinks
in content delivery. One court likened the provision of a hyperlink to “using a
library’s card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more
efficiently.”136 Another court described hyperlinking as the “digital equivalent of
giving the recipient driving directions to another website on the Internet.”137 These

132. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
133. Ironically, the Copyright Act allows the display of a copy of a work by an owner lawfully in
possession of that copy “without the authority of the copyright owner.” By misreading a “possession of
a copy” requirement into the second clause of the “public display” definition, the Ninth Circuit has
effectively flipped this rule to make possession of a digital copy a prerequisite of liability for public display
by transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title,
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to
viewers present at the place where the copy is located.”)
134. H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 64 (1976) (“Each and every method by which the images or sounds
comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission.’”).
135. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
136. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99–7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
137. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 963 F. Supp. 2d 239, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also Perfect
10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161 (“The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the user’s browser.
The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing image.”).
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metaphors naturally support the conclusion that a hyperlink does not constitute part
of the “process” of content transmission—in the view of most U.S. courts,
hyperlinks, like “library’s card index[es]” and “driving directions” merely supply the
information necessary for third parties to make a transfer, but they are not part of the
transfer itself. However, these metaphors overlook the range of functions that
hyperlinks serve on the Internet.
Hyperlinks do provide information about the online location of the content that
the user seeks to access. This locational-information function is, indeed, analogous
to the function fulfilled by a “library’s card index” or “driving directions” in that it
connects two end-points which seek to communicate with each other, but does not
itself constitute part of the process that communicates a work from point A (the
source site) to point B (the user’s device)—the provision of locational information
simply makes the communication possible. However, most hyperlinks are clickable
when presented on the webpages, and therefore these hyperlinks also act as a trigger
which, when clicked, commence the communication between two end-points. When
a user clicks on a hyperlink on a webpage, or visits a webpage that utilizes an in-line
link, the hyperlink (and the underlying HTML code) triggers the transfer of
information between the server and the user’s browser. In other words, the hyperlink,
when clicked, sets in motion the process through which the ultimate communication
is consummated. This is the fundamental difference between a URL which is printed
on a page in a book (which provides only locational information, and which can be
utilized only if a user enters the address into her browser) and a URL which is
embedded in a website as hypertext (which typically appears as blue, underlined
text).
From a purely technical perspective, then, a clickable link that appears as
hypertext on a website consists of more than just locational information. A hyperlink
becomes clickable on a website only when the website’s HTML code includes an
HTML “tag” and a portion of code which turns the URL address into a clickable
button which will lead the user’s browser directly to the linked-to website. For
example, a hyperlink to www.copyright.gov will display as a clickable hyperlink on
a webpage only when the webpage’s code contains the script: “<a
href=“www.copyright.gov”>www.copyright.gov</a>.” 138 The code surrounding
the URL address exists only to activate the process of communication between server
and browser.
Moreover, hyperlinks are often disguised as text (i.e. “click here”) or presented
graphically as buttons on a website.139 In these contexts, the “trigger” function of
hyperlinks is particularly prominent—the hyperlink still provides locational
information to the user’s browser, but the hyperlink is presented to the user as a way
to start a process through which another website’s home page (simple link), or a

138. HTML Links, W3SCHOOLS.COM, https://perma.cc/UV2F-FBLE (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
139. Connecting to Other Websites, STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES: COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE,
https://perma.cc/8HAJ-WE9K (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (“[A] website will connect to another in the
form of a link (also known as a ‘hypertext’ link), a specially coded word or image that when clicked upon,
will take a user to another Web page.”) (emphasis supplied).
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specific piece of content (deep link, in-line link) will be delivered to the user’s
browser.
Instead of the only partially accurate “library card” and “driving directions”
metaphors, we propose a more precise analogy: telephone directory assistance
services. These services (typically reached by dialing the numbers “411” on a
telephone) first connect a caller to a directory assistance operator, who helps the user
identify the phone number of the intended recipient—thus providing the information
necessary to connect two end-points (caller and recipient) and fulfilling a function
analogous to the function served by “driving directions” or a “library’s card index.”
However, most directory assistance services do more: if the caller requests, the
directory assistance operator may re-direct the caller’s phone line to the intended
recipient’s line, thereby setting in motion the technical process through which the
two end-points in fact connect. Similarly, a hyperlink both provides locational
information to a user’s browser, and (when clicked) sets in motion the process
through which the user’s browser requests the source server to deliver the desired
content.
The role that directory assistance plays in the ultimate transmission of information
between two end-points is optional; the caller could simply bypass directory
assistance if the caller knows the right number to call, just as the Internet user can
bypass the use of a hyperlink if the user knows the URL address of the website she
intends to visit. But if a user does use directory assistance not only to identify the
number but also to place the call, it seems evident that the call-placement role played
by the directory assistance operators is part of the “process” through which a
telephone user reaches a recipient. Similarly, a clickable hyperlink must be
considered part of the “process” through which a user accesses a piece of underlying
content: after a user clicks a link, the HTML code embedded in the link begins the
process of transmission by supplying the URL location of the content to the user’s
browser and instructing the browser to access that URL, after which the browser
completes the process of retrieving the content from the source server.
Moreover, some hyperlinks provide a further function by presenting the
underlying material in a specific manner or context, or by cutting out intermediary
steps that would otherwise be necessary for the user to access the content. While it
may be true that a “simple” link (i.e. a URL to the U.S. Copyright Office’s home
page) fulfills a function limited to sending the user to another site that will in turn
provide information about the location of a particular piece of content, deep links
and in-line links do more than provide locational information—they instead serve up
content directly to the user.140 In-line links may be used to “frame” the content in a
particular way on a website—thus in-line links can deliver content directly to a user
without the need to navigate to a new webpage, or can place content in a specific
140. ALAI, Report and Opinion on: a Berne-compatible reconciliation of hyperlinking and the
communication to the public right on the internet (June 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/B9FG-CDJP (“[Inline and deep] links offer the works to the public in such a way that the members of the public may access
the works at a place and time chosen by them. Those who furnish these kinds of links make it possible to
bring the works directly to the computer or device screens of the user, or to download them directly to the
computer or device, without further intermediation.”)
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context alongside other content, or draw attention to a particular portion of the
content (e.g., a particular page in an in-line linked PDF document). Similarly, deep
links deliver the content to the user directly, stripping away the need to navigate
through the source website to access that work. In other words, in-line and deep links
not only fulfill the function of a “library’s card index” by identifying the location of
a piece of content—these links take the metaphorical book off the library’s shelf,
place the book in the recipient’s hands, and turn to a particular page.
Thus, the server rule rests on an under-inclusive reading of the term “process”
under which the “process” begins at the physical origin of the content, and ends with
the delivery of that content to the browser (thus excluding from the term “process”
any preliminary steps which provide the user’s browser with the location of the
desired content, or set the process in motion by providing a button or a piece of code
which begins the process of transmission). From a technological perspective, then,
the “server rule,” mischaracterizes the “process” contemplated by section 101. More
importantly, setting aside the technological minutiae of the process through which
clickable deep or in-line links cause a work’s images or sounds to be received by the
end user, it “makes no difference” to the user’s experience of the work whether its
delivery emanated directly from the source site, or arrived through the mediation of
a link.141 As the copyright holder noted in its arguments before the Ninth Circuit in
Perfect 10 v. Amazon, the court’s interpretive approach draws a legal line which
completely ignores the user experience: the typical viewer of a website has no way
of distinguishing content which is stored on the servers of the website operator (and
which is thus being “displayed” under the logic of the server rule) and content which
is pulled from a third-party server through an in-line link (which, according to the
server rule, is not being displayed by the website operator). This user-agnostic
approach is in tension with Supreme Court case law which instructs courts to “focus
on the [work] as presented to, and perceptible by” the public142 when interpreting the
Copyright Act.143
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
cast doubt on analyses that privilege technical characterization over user
experience. 144 In Aereo, the Supreme Court held that a service which provided
online access to broadcast television committed acts of “public performance” even
though it used user-specific television antennae to send user-specific retransmissions of televised content to each user. A significant part of the majority’s
analysis focused on comparing Aereo’s product to traditional television cable
delivery services (which do commit acts of “public performance”). The Court

141. In a recent case, the Supreme Court made a similar observation, noting that “technological
differences” that do not “significantly alter the [user’s] experience” should not govern the interpretation
of the public display and performance rights under §106. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498, 2508 (2014).
142. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499 (2001).
143. See, e.g., Brief of Getty Images (US) Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Goldman
v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 3144 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017), at 5 (noting the
tension between Perfect 10 and Tasini).
144. Id. at 2506.

GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018)

186

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[41:2

strongly de-emphasized the technical differences between the two services, and
instead focused on the user experience:
In terms of the Act’s purposes, [the differences between Aereo’s product and traditional
cable services] do not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do perform
“publicly.” Viewed in terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives, why should any of
these technological differences matter? They concern the behind-the-scenes way in
which Aereo delivers television programming to its viewers’ screens. They do not
render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of cable companies. Nor
do they significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers. Why would
a subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care much whether images and
sounds are delivered to his screen via a large multi subscriber antenna or one small
dedicated antenna, whether they arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or
whether they are transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made?145

Therefore, the Aereo Court’s logic dismisses the kind of “technological
differences” that underlie the server rule. The technical differences between Aereo’s
system of delivering content and the system used by traditional cable companies had
no bearing on whether Aereo’s actions fell within the statutory definition of “public
performance.” One might wonder why the technical differences between the
delivery of a piece of content stored on a website’s server, and the delivery of a piece
of content in-line linked to that website should matter at all to the analysis of whether
that website commits an act of “public performance or display” when most users of
that website are completely unable to distinguish between the two.146
Furthermore, the assumption that a hyperlink does not fall within the definition of
public performance or display may be conceptually inconsistent with other
authoritative U.S. case law. Other appellate court decisions (rendered before the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Amazon) found that when an actor
contributes to an overall process of content delivery to an end-user, that actor may
have committed an act of public display or performance even though the actor’s
contribution to the process did not, standing alone, result in the delivery of content
to a user. In other words, an actor commits a public performance or display when
that actor carries out “any step in the process by which a protected work wends its
way to its audience.”147 Moreover, the reasoning of more recent U.S. Supreme Court
145. Id. at 2508–09.
146. The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently opined that this aspect of the
Aereo decision casts doubt on the user-agnostic logic of the server rule. See Justin Goldman v. Breitbart
News Network, LLC., Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (noting that Aereo
“strongly support[s] [the] argument that liability should not hinge on invisible, technical processes
imperceptible to the viewer” like the server location of a piece of content embedded on a website). In
2012, the French Cour de Cassation accepted a similar argument based on the user’s impression of the
source of the work, and held that an unauthorized in-line link to a work on a third-party website was
infringing because users may have been under the impression that the content was located on the linking
website. See Google France v. Bac Films, Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters],
666 1e civ., July 12, 2012, Bull. civ. I, No. 166 (Fr.), https://perma.cc/X8DZ-PEXU.
147. NFL v. Primetime 24, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000). See also David v. Showtime/The Movie
Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Congress intended the definition of [public
performance] to encompass each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to [the
public]”).
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precedent may have implicitly cast further doubt on the logical underpinnings and
statutory consistency of the server rule. In a different part of the Supreme Court’s
Aereo opinion, the Supreme Court held that an actor who takes a step which “simply
enhances viewers’ ability to receive” an existing public display or performance may
commit an act of public performance or display.148 If one concedes that a hyperlink
“enhances viewers’ ability to receive” a piece of already-available content by
providing and acting on the locational information that allows a protected work to
“wend[] its way to its audience” of Internet users, it seems difficult to reconcile the
server rule with this authority.149

148. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506.
149. The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently suggested that the server test
could be limited to the facts of the Perfect 10 case. See Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC.,
Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 22-24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018). The court opined that “even if [Perfect
10] correctly interprets the [Copyright] Act,” the server test could be read narrowly because the Ninth
Circuit’s holding was “heavily informed by . . . the fact that the defendant operated a search engine, and
the fact that the user made an active choice to click on [a thumbnail] image [in the Google Image search
results] before it was displayed.” In other words, the court suggested that there may be a fundamental
difference between (i) a search engine which presents users with clickable links (i.e. the “thumbnail”
images in Google’s Image Search results) which, when clicked, summon an image from a third-party
server, and (ii) a website which simply embeds the same image on a homepage and presents the image to
the user “whether he or she asked for it, looked for it, clicked on it, or not.” Id. at 23. However, neither
the function of the defendant website (search engine or ordinary webpage) nor the “active choice” of the
user to activate an embedded link should have any relevance to the direct infringement question.
First, the court’s suggestion that different rules may apply to search engines has no basis in the text or
legislative history of the Copyright Act. The court suggested that the purpose behind Google’s use of the
copyrighted images (to provide an internet search service) was relevant to the question of whether Google
“displayed” the images, pointing to a portion of the lower court’s opinion in Perfect 10 in which that court
stated that “[m]erely to index the web so that users can more readily find the information they seek should
not constitute direct infringement.” Id. (quoting Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 844 (C.D. Cal.
2006)). However, while the purpose and character of a search engine’s use of copyrighted images may be
relevant to the fair use question, see Perfect 10. v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
that “Google’s use of thumbnails is highly transformative” because a search engine “transforms the image
into a pointing directing the user to a source of information”), and the status of an online service provider
as an “information location tool” may be relevant to whether the site qualifies for safe harbor under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (establishing a safe harbor for “[i]nformation
location tools”), nothing in the language of the Copyright Act suggests that such a consideration should
be relevant to the interpretation of the definitions of “public display” or “to transmit” for the purposes of
direct infringement analysis.
Second, the court’s attempt to distinguish websites which display embedded content only after a user
activates an embedded link (as was the case in Perfect 10), and pages which display embedded content
without user activation (e.g. a blog with an embedded image) conflicts with the court’s interpretation of
the Aereo decision. The Goldman court noted that because the users in Perfect 10 could view the full-size
images only “after clicking on one of the thumbnails,” Google Image Search was better characterized as
“a service whereby the user navigated from webpage to webpage, with Google’s assistance,” which is
“manifestly not the same as opening up a favorite blog or website to find a full color image awaiting the
user, whether he or she asked for it, looked for it, clicked on it, or not.” Goldman v. Breitbart News, Civ.
No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 23 (quoting Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. At 843). However, even though
Google Image Search users must click on a “thumbnail” image before Google displays a framed image
from the source website, Google still presents the framed image to the user within the context of its own
website—the user is not made aware that by clicking a thumbnail image, the user has called up an image
from a third-party server. And as the Goldman court notes earlier in its opinion, the Supreme Court’s
Aereo decision establishes that such “mere technical distinctions invisible to the user should not be the
lynchpin on which copyright liability lies.” Id. at 21.
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Given the logical and doctrinal inconsistencies underpinning the server rule, one
might sense that other imperatives lent bad arguments more credibility than they
deserved. One might suspect that a desire to avoid imposing direct copyright liability
on the widespread practice of Internet hyperlinking may have motivated the adoption
of the rule in Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The lower court in the Perfect 10 litigation noted
that a contrary result would “ensnare AOL, Dell, Microsoft, and Netscape” with
unexpected copyright liability, and other commentators had noted (before the Perfect
10 v. Amazon decision) that imposing direct liability on links would “have farreaching limiting effects on the development of the World Wide Web” and that such
a rule would impose liability on “every online service provider directly linking to
copyrighted works.”150
However, by responding to these concerns with a broad rule that precludes any
direct liability for linking, the Ninth Circuit may have overlooked the possibility that
other areas of copyright law could have alleviated these unwanted outcomes. Section
512(d) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a safe harbor for
actors who may otherwise have infringed copyright through the use of “information
location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link.”151
The Ninth Circuit could have recognized that actors who provide hyperlinks may be
found directly liable for copyright infringement under the correct interpretation of
the relevant statutory provisions, but that those defendants may claim protection
under the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions by proving compliance with the DMCA’s
safe harbor qualification requirements.152
Statutory safe harbors to one side, even were U.S. courts to abandon the server
rule, other issues remain for resolution before a court rules that a link to unauthorized
content constitutes a violation of the § 106 display, performance, or distribution
rights. Even assuming that a hyperlink is part of the “process” through which content
is delivered, it is not clear whether the “process” itself must be realized (through an
ultimate delivery of the content, beginning with the activation of a link) or whether
it would suffice for that delivery merely to be incipient. In other words, is there a
public performance or display if a link is simply posted, but never clicked? With
respect to the exclusive right of distribution of a work in copies, U.S. case law is
inconsistent on the question whether a violation of the right requires proof of an
“actual download,” or whether the “making available” of access to an online copy is
sufficient to support an infringement claim.153 By contrast, case law suggests that

150. Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12B.01[A][2] (2005)); Matthew C. Staples, Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 80–81 (2003).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (emphasis supplied).
152. Qualifying for the DMCA’s safe harbor requires that the defendant prove compliance with the
particular requirements of the specific claimed safe harbor, which will be discussed below. See infra
Section III.C.
153. Compare London-Sire Records v. Does, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding
that “evidence and allegations, taken together, [can be] sufficient to allow a statistically reasonable
inference that at least one copyrighted work was downloaded at least once” and that this inference is
“sufficient to make out a prima facie case” of infringement), with Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell,
554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that “[t]he general rule, supported by the great weight
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for claims of infringement of the public display or performance rights, the plaintiff
need not prove that an Internet user in fact accessed the file at issue. The Copyright
Office takes the position that the definition of to perform or display a work “publicly”
“is properly construed” to reach “offers to stream, rather than just completed
transmissions,” even though the issue has not been “squarely resolved by courts.”154
This interpretation arguably is inconsistent with the statutory language, whose
reference to the receipt of a transmission in the statutory definition of public
performance or display could suggest a completed transmission. 155 On the other
hand, interpreting the statutory definition to preclude prospective receipt of
performances or displays of works of authorship would create tension between that
interpretation of the definition section and other sections of the Copyright Act, which
cover both completed and incipient transmissions. 156 Moreover, such an
interpretation would set the U.S. at odds with the international norm: as we have
seen, the “making available” right in the WCT and WPPT unambiguously covers
prospective communications. 157 When the meaning of the domestic norm is in
doubt, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction directs courts to interpret
U.S. law consistently with the nation’s international obligations.158

of authority, is that infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies
or phonorecords”), and Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243–45 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (stating that the distribution right guaranteed by the Copyright Act may be infringed by an offer to
distribute, although merely alleging that files were made available, without alleging that they were also
distributed, is not enough to state a claim). For extensive analysis of the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act contending that offers to distribute constitute actionable distribution, see generally Peter
Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J.
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1 (2012).
154. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 37; see also Cmty. Broad. Serv. v. Time
Warner Cable, LLC, No. 07-139-B-W, 2008 WL 3200661, at *9–10 (D. Me. Aug. 7, 2008) (noting that
the plaintiff alleging a performance “to the public” need only allege that the transmission “was capable of
being viewed by a substantial number of people,” and that the plaintiff “need not prove that a substantial
number of people actually viewed the challenged transmission”).
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining public performance and display as a transmission “to the public
. . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”) (emphasis supplied).
156. For example, Section 506 of the Copyright Act provides for criminal penalties for any person
who commits an infringement “by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution,
by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew
or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.” 17 U.S.C. § 506
(emphasis supplied). As David Carson, former General Counsel of the U.S. Copyright Office, has pointed
out, “[i]t is hard to fathom how this language can be read as anything other than Congress telling us, in
the form of an amendment to the copyright statute, that the distribution right includes the act of making
copies available.” David O. Carson, Making the Making Available Right Available: 22nd Annual Horace
S. Manges Lecture, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135, 160–61 (2010).
157. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 55–56.
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b. The Server Rule and Its Implications for In-line Linking
Many software experts have long argued that the principle of “universal free
linking” is fundamental to the proper functioning of the World Wide Web.159 Before
Perfect 10 v. Amazon, legal scholars noted their opposition to the use of copyright or
other legal regimes to impose liability for linking, which they believed to be
antithetical to the role of a link on the Internet.160 One Internet user noted that “[t]o
ask permission to link to a page borders on the inane. Next, we will have the position
that you cannot recommend a book in the local library without the author’s
permission.”161
However, the adoption of the “server rule” may have over-applied this principle
by holding that even in-line links, which integrate content onto the linker’s website
in a way that makes that content appear (to the Internet user) as if it originated on the
linker’s website, cannot constitute direct copyright infringement. This aspect of the
holding of Perfect 10 v. Amazon allows any website operator freely to incorporate
copyrighted elements from other websites (through in-line linking) without incurring
any direct copyright liability, and has been hailed as a “major victory for web site
operators” who need no longer worry about copyright liability (or seek licenses from
copyright holders) when incorporating works found on other websites onto their own
websites.162
Such a “victory” may make it difficult for copyright owners safely to use the
Internet to publish their works without losing control of how their works are
presented to audiences. If any copyrighted work, published online, can be freely
framed on another unaffiliated and unauthorized website, copyright owners may lose
the ability to derive advertising revenue from presenting their works on their own
websites, as well as the ability to determine the presentational context in which their
works appear, and the ability to derive licensing revenue from other websites which
seek to use their copyrighted material.163 Some commentators have argued that legal
159. See Sableman, supra note 1, at 1275 (describing the views of Tim Berners-Lee, one of the first
software experts to develop the internet protocol, who believed that “[t]he universality [of free linking] is
essential to the Web: it loses its power if there are certain types of things to which you can’t link”).
160. Id. at 1276 (noting that “most Internet users see links as desirable on all sides and are puzzled
by any legal scheme that would penalize or restrict use of such mutually beneficial indexes, roadmaps,
and accolades”).
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. Lee Burgunder & Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline Web Designing After Perfect 10, 17 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 17 (2008) (“[As a result of Perfect 10] a website that posts its own copyrighted
materials cannot complain that other sites are displaying those same works as part of their offerings as
long as those displays are made through inline web designing.”).
163. Letter from Nancy E. Wolff, Counsel, PACA, Digital Media Licensing Association, Inc. to
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 15, 2014), at 4 (responding on
behalf of visual arts trade associations to the U.S. Copyright Office’s July 15, 2014 Notice of Inquiry).
The court in Perfect 10 did suggest that trademark law, rather than copyright law, should protect publishers
from “acts that cause customer confusion,” indicating that the problem of “in-line linking and framing
[which may] cause some computer users to believe they are viewing a single . . . webpage” is not addressed
by the Copyright Act. See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). The court also
suggested that in-line linking or framing could “raise[] contributory liability issues.” Id. Secondary
liability (a doctrine of which contributory liability is a subset) will be discussed further below, but because
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regimes which allow unrestricted in-line linking to Internet works will force
copyright owners to implement additional technical restrictions when publishing
their works online, thus making them less freely available to the public. 164
Commentators have also noted that a regime which forces copyright owners to rely
on technical restrictions to publish their works online without fear of unauthorized
in-line linking may be unfair to “the unseasoned Internet publisher,” who, unlike
large, commercial websites, may “not have the time, resources, training, or
experience to thwart unwanted links.”165
c. The Server Rule and the International Obligation to Implement the Making
Available Right
The server rule adopted in Perfect 10 v. Amazon may also put the United States at
risk of falling short of its obligation to protect copyright owners’ “making available”
right under the WCT and the WPPT.166 Some commentators have put forward the
argument that the server rule “eviscerates” the making available right by allowing
other websites to in-line or frame their copyrighted content without permission, thus
divesting the copyright holders of the ability to control how their works are
disseminated online.167 The server rule’s exclusion of deep and in-line linking is
also at odds with our interpretation of the WIPO Treaties’ designation of the “place”
from which members of the public choose to access works.168
The Copyright Office noted many of these arguments in a recent report on the
“making available” right, but simply concluded that there remained doubt about
whether “a court might deem certain forms of inline linking or framing
distinguishable from the technology in Perfect 10 for purposes of the server test” and
that “[c]onclusive resolution of these issues will require further guidance from

claims of secondary liability must rest on an act of direct liability, secondary liability may not protect
copyright holders from websites which in-line link to authorized display of performances of their works.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. Staples, supra note 150, at 82 (“Rather than acquiring a license for copyrighted images, Web
authors could freely code their webpages to inline link to images residing on others’ servers. Servers
hosting popular images, particularly those of broad or general relevance, would be linked to by several
webpages and would have to employ technological controls to prevent such linking.”). Similar critiques
were voiced in the EU after the CJEU extended the Svensson doctrine to in-line linking in the BestWater
case.
See Case C-348/13, BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes, (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://perma.cc/6KZN-L7A9; Leistner, supra note 27, at 329-30 (noting that the CJEU’s BestWater case,
in applying the Svensson doctrine to “framed” or in-line links, may “allow[] the author’s work to be placed
in contexts with which he or she may not agree” and thus forces an “all-or-nothing” decision on the
original publisher, who must choose “whether he or she will prevent or permit corresponding linking in
principle by deploying technical protective measures,” and further arguing in support of a recognition that
all “frame links misappropriating third-party material fall under the [communication to the public] right”
notwithstanding the “new public” criterion); see also supra notes 23–25 (discussing Svensson).
165. Staples, supra note 150, at 89.
166. See supra Part I.
167. PACA et al,. supra note 163, at 4. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 49
(noting these arguments).
168. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
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courts.” 169 Further guidance from courts and commentators, rejecting or at least
questioning the server rule, may now be emerging.170 As a result, U.S. courts may
come to abandon or limit application of the server rule in a way that will bring U.S.
copyright law in line with the WCT and the WPPT’s provisions, assuming that the
“making available” right reaches at least some forms of linking.171
In any event, the U.S. exclusion of direct liability for hyperlinking would not
preclude U.S. compliance with its international obligations, so long as U.S. law
furnished an alternative basis for effective enforcement of the exclusive rights of
public performance and display.172 We next consider whether the U.S. doctrine of
secondary liability, as applied to hyperlinking, sufficiently fills the gap.
B. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Implications of Treating Hyperlinking Under Secondary Liability
Current U.S. doctrine bars claims of direct copyright infringement for
hyperlinking and instead addresses hyperlinking through secondary infringement
analysis. In the E.U., the lack of harmonization of secondary liability standards
across E.U. member states provided the impetus for characterizing direct violations
of the right of communication to the public to encompass at least some kinds of
facilitation of infringement by means of hyperlinking.173 In the U.S., by contrast,
copyright doctrine is effectively “harmonized” across jurisdictions with respect to
both direct and secondary liability. Albeit based in the common law, secondary
liability for copyright infringement is a matter of federal law rather than of the laws
of the fifty states. Treating hyperlinking as a matter of secondary liability thus does
not present the problem of multiple inconsistent national standards that confronted
the CJEU.
This is not to say that the U.S. standards for direct and secondary liability for
copyright infringement are identical. While direct infringement in the U.S. is a strict
liability offense, 174 the secondary liability doctrine of contributory infringement
requires that the secondary infringer “know[s] or [has] reason to know” of direct

169. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 50–51.
170. In two recent cases, district courts have expressly declined to follow the server test citing doubts
about the reasoning of the Perfect 10 decision. See supra note 99 (discussing Justin Goldman v. Breitbart
News Network, LLC, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) and The Leader’s Institute,
LLC v. Robert Jackson, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 WL 5629514 (N.D. Tex. 2017)).
171. For example, in Goldman v. Breitbart News, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York attempted to limit the server test to the facts of Perfect 10. See
supra note 149 (analyzing the court’s attempt to limit the server test in Goldman).
172. Cf. Communication to the Public by Telecommunication: Scope of Section 2.4(1.1) of the
Copyright Act—Making Available, CB-CDA 2017-085 (Copyright Board of Canada, Aug. 25, 2017), at
¶ 162 (regarding national implementation of the WCT art. 8 making available right: “What name a right
is given in domestic legislation does not make it any more or any less compliant. What is important is
that all the acts contemplated by the treaties are covered through one or more exclusive rights.”).
173. See supra section II.A. See also Lyubomira Midelieva, Rethinking Hyperlinking: Addressing
Hyperlinks to Unauthorised Content in Copyright Law and Policy, 39 EIPR 479, 487 (2017).
174. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2016).
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infringement.175 The server rule thus makes a hyperlinking defendant’s liability turn
on its actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing nature of the infringed
work.176
2. Secondary Liability Doctrines in the United States
Copyright actions in the U.S. concerning secondary liability for hyperlinking
typically allege that the defendant linked to an unauthorized source of a work
protected by copyright. Because U.S. courts have reiterated that there can be no
secondary liability absent a primary infringement of copyright,177 plaintiffs therefore
will not succeed on secondary infringement claims based on links to authorized
sources because the access which the link enables is not itself an act of direct
infringement.178

175. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.3d 829, 845 & 846 n.29 (11th Cir. 1990)).
176. This aspect of the secondary infringement analysis under U.S. law parallels the knowledgebased standard which the CJEU imposed in the GS Media case. See supra Part II.
177. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“[B]oth contributory and vicarious infringements require someone to have directly infringed the
copyright.”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, a
claim of secondary infringement requires that the facilitated act of direct infringement occurs within the
United States. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1091–95 (9th Cir. 1994).
But see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 3.1, at 71
(2001) (criticizing the “overly rigid conception of territoriality” reflected in Subafilms and arguing that
such a conception “may result in the conclusion that no infringement has occurred anywhere,” especially
in the context of suits regarding “[t]he use of digital networks to transmit copyrighted works to individual
recipients on demand, and proposing an “effects-based test of territoriality”).
178. In support of secondary infringement claims, some plaintiffs have advanced the theory that
when a defendant causes (by way of hyperlink or HTML code) the plaintiff’s copyrighted work to be
downloaded onto a user’s RAM memory, that defendant causes an act of direct infringement on behalf of
the user, which qualifies as an act of direct infringement on which a claim of secondary liability can be
predicated. See, e.g., Live Face on Web, LLC v. Control Group Media Co., 150 F. Supp. 3d 489, 498
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (“A visitor to one of Defendant’s web pages . . . download[s] a copy [of plantiff’s
software] into his computer’s RAM, thereby infringing the [plaintiff’s] copyright.”). Such an argument
rests on the assumption that any user who visits any webpage commits an act of direct infringement by
automatically downloading copyrighted works contained on the website to RAM memory, even if the user
does not save the image to her hard drive in a more permanent form. Not all courts accept this theory—
in Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1169, the Ninth Circuit considered whether “[l]ocal caching [of
copyrighted images] by the browsers of individual users” that occurs when a user’s browser automatically
stores the images to RAM for the purposes of displaying those images on a computer screen constituted a
violation of the reproduction right. The court held that “even assuming such automatic copying could
constitute direct infringement, it is a fair use” because “[i]t is designed to enhance an individual’s
computer use, not to supersede the copyright holders’ exploitation of their works.” Id.
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U.S. copyright law recognizes three forms of secondary liability: vicarious
infringement, 179 contributory infringement, 180 and inducement of infringement. 181
Vicarious infringement lies when a defendant “profit[s] from direct infringement
while declining to exercise the right to stop or limit it.”182 In order to prove a claim
of contributory infringement, the copyright holder must show that the defendant
“induce[d], cause[d], or materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of another”
“with knowledge of the infringing activity.”183 Lastly, inducement of infringement
may lie if the defendant takes “active steps . . . to encourage direct infringement, such
as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use,”
builds a business model which “confirm[s] that [the defendant’s] principal object” is
to facilitate infringement of copyright, and takes no effort to limit the infringing
activity resulting from its acts.184

179. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 & n.9 (2005) (“[O]ne . . . infringes
vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it. . . .
[A] vicarious liability theory . . . allows imposition of liability when the defendant profits directly from
the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, even if the defendant initially
lacks knowledge of the infringement.”).
180. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”).
181. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (holding that “[e]vidence of active steps . . . taken to encourage direct
infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show
an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe,” which may support a claim of secondary liability
under an inducement-of-infringement theory) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
182. Id. at 914. The doctrine of vicarious infringement developed to account for situations in which
a defendant exercises some supervisory role over infringing actors, and benefits from that activity without
exercising its right to stop the infringement. Thus, the doctrine of vicarious liability is a poor fit for the
hyperlinking context, in which the linker rarely has control over the infringing activity to which it links.
While it may be argued that a linker may “control” a linked-to source by simply removing the link, courts
have held that the “control” element in vicarious infringement analysis requires the actual ability to stop
the direct infringement. See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1173–74 (holding that Google’s right to
terminate a particular website’s advertising contract “does not give Google the right to stop direct
infringement” because “an infringing third-party website can continue to reproduce, display, and distribute
its infringing copies of [plaintiff’s] copyrighted works after its” contract with Google ended, and thus
Google could not be found liable as a vicarious infringer). Nevertheless, some plaintiffs have brought
vicarious infringement claims in the hyperlinking context based on the theory that the defendant’s website
users committed an act of direct infringement (by visiting defendant’s website and automatically
downloading the plaintiff’s copyrighted works which were framed on that website to RAM memory), and
that the defendant, as the operator of the website, had the right and ability to stop these acts of userinfringement by altering the website. See, e.g., Live Face on Web, LLC v. Howard Stern Prods., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 08-2579, 2009 WL 723481, at *2–4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009). These cases are rare, and
such a theory of vicarious liability may ultimately fail because courts have held that the automatic
downloading to RAM of a work by an Internet user simply for the purposes of browsing the Internet is
fair use. See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1169 (holding that “even assuming such automatic copying
could constitute direct infringement, it is a fair use” because “it is designed to enhance an individual’s
computer use, not to supersede the copyright holders’ exploitation of their works.”).
183. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
184. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 926, 936. See also Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1171 (“[U]nder
Grokster, an actor may be contributorily liable for intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the
actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain to result in such direct infringement.”).
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a. Contributory Infringement
The contributory infringement analysis poses dual criteria: (1) “personal conduct
that encourages or assists” an act of direct infringement (also framed as “material
contribution” to an act of direct infringement) and (2) actual or constructive
knowledge of the specific direct infringement.185
Under the contributory liability doctrine, even the provision of a “simple link”
could constitute an act of secondary infringement if that link “encourages or assists”
an ultimate act of infringement. 186 In most of the reported cases concerning
secondary liability for hyperlinking, courts have found that providing a hyperlink to
an unauthorized source, in addition to some “encouraging” activity, satisfied the
“personal conduct that encourages or assists” or “material contribution” requirement.
For example, in Pearson Education, Inc. v. Ishayev, the court found that a defendant
who sold unauthorized versions of educational materials online and provided the
materials to its customers by providing links to file sharing sites through which the
infringing materials could be downloaded “plainly” carried out “conduct that
encourages or assists in copyright infringement” and could thus be found
contributorily liable.187 In Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, a
defendant who had posted hyperlinks to third-party websites which offered
infringing copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted material on blog posts encouraging
readers to download the materials was held to have “materially contributed” to the
acts of direct infringement carried out by the third-party websites.188
It may be true that the reported cases do not concern “pure” acts of hyperlinking
(i.e. the mere provision of a link, without any encouragement to use the link).
Because most of the U.S. precedent on contributory liability for linking concerns
some additional “encouraging” activity (i.e. encouraging users to click a link on a
blog post, as in Utah Lighthouse, or selling a customer access to a link, as in Ishayev),
it is theoretically possible for a defendant who merely provided a link to argue
successfully that the provision of a link alone does not rise to the level of “material
contribution” to an act of direct infringement. However, some courts have noted that
acts which “facilitate access to websites throughout the world can significantly
magnify the effects of otherwise immaterial infringing activities,” which supports
the assumption that the mere provision of a link to an unauthorized source (which

185. Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
186. For example, if the provided simple link takes the user to the homepage of a website aggregating
links to unauthorized sources which the user must then navigate to access the infringing content on the
third-party sites, the link provider’s act could constitute an act of contributory infringement (or inducement
of infringement) if her act “induce[d], cause[d], or materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of
another” “with knowledge of the infringing activity.” Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
187. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 9 F. Supp. 3d 328, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[S]ending hyperlinks
that permit others to download protected materials would plainly amount to conduct that encourages or
assists in copyright infringement.”).
188. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294-95 (D. Utah
1999) (granting an injunction after finding that defendants “actively encouraged the infringement of
plaintiff’s copyright” by posting three download links and by providing further instructions to a user on
how to browse the material after one of the links didn’t work).
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necessarily facilitates and expands access to that source) itself can constitute a
material contribution to the underlying act of direct infringement.189
The second element, actual or constructive knowledge, is more complex. The
knowledge standard for contributory infringement analysis is “an objective one;
contributory infringement liability is imposed on persons who ‘know or have reason
to know” of the direct infringement.190 Generally, the analysis of the knowledge
standard will consist of two inquiries: First, can the plaintiff prove that the defendant
has specific knowledge of the particular works to which it is alleged to have
facilitated access (in contrast to a defendant who may not be aware of the particular
acts of infringement which it is facilitating)?191 Second, can the plaintiff prove that
the defendant had knowledge that the acts it facilitated were infringements of
copyright? In most notable contributory liability cases, these two inquiries collapse
into one—for example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.192 the court assumed
that Napster was aware that the files it was helping its users distribute were infringing
versions of copyrighted songs, and focused instead on whether Napster had “specific
information which identifie[d] infringing activity.” 193 Because the Napster
organization maintained a central index of all the files shared on its system, the court
was able to conclude that Napster had reason to know of the specific instances of
infringement which were occurring on its platform (and thus “fail[ed] to remove the
material and thereby stop [infringing copies] from being distributed,” which satisfied
the actual knowledge element).194
Therefore, inquiry into whether the defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the particular works to which its offending hyperlink facilitated access
189. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1172.
190. Arista Records, LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2010). Since the Supreme Court’s
decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the Fourth Circuit has held that
contructive knowledge will not suffice to support claims of contributory liability, absent a finding of actual
knowledge or willful blindness. See BMG Rights Mgmt (US) LLC v. Cox Comm’ns Inc., No. 17-1353,
2018 WL 650316 at *8–11 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2018) (holding that a contributory infringement claim requires
actual knowledge of, or willful blindness to the facilitated acts of infringement, and that “negligence does
not suffice to prove contributory infringement”). In BMG Rights Mgmt v. Cox, The Fourth Circuit based
this conclusion on the observation that “Grokster’s recitation of the [knowledge] standard—that “[o]ne
infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement”—is on its face
difficult to reconcile with a negligence standard.” Id. at *9 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 914). However,
many commentators frame the Grokster opinion as the introduction of a “new theory of secondary liability
for copyright infringement” rather than a modification of the actual-or-constructive-knowledge standard
under traditional contributory liability analysis. See, e.g. Evan F. Fitts, Note, Inducement Liability for
Copyright Infringement Is Born: The Supreme Court Attempts to Remedy the Law's Broken Leg with a
Cast on the Arm, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 767, 779 (2006). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep
from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology
Entrepreneurs, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 584 (2008) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sony Sheep] (noting that “the
[Grokster] Court declined to analyze what the standard for contributory infringement would be when
intent to foster infringement cannot be shown”).
191. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a computer
system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such
material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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will supply the first step in the analysis of knowledge for claims of contributory
liability by hyperlink. Because the provision of a deep or in-line link is, in most
cases, an act that relates specifically to one particular source and one particular
copyrighted work (and not an act that facilitates large number of potential
infringements through the provision of a platform, as in the Napster case), the linker
will necessarily know which works it is targeting.
In cases which involve linking to websites which aggregate infringing content
(e.g. sites which aggregate online sources of infringing works of films and television
content), defendants may be able to argue that they lack the particularized knowledge
of the specific works available through the linked-to website. In such cases, the
defendant’s generalized knowledge that some infringement occurs on the linked-to
website may not suffice to meet the actual or constructive knowledge predicate to
liability for contributory infringement. However, even if plaintiffs fail to prove that
the defendant had particularized knowledge of the specific works available through
the linked-to site, plaintiffs still may proceed under the doctrine of inducement of
infringement, which furnishes a way to impose liability on defendants who lack
particularized knowledge but who take “active steps” to encourage infringement.195
Nonetheless, in most hyperlinking cases (aside from cases involving links to
aggregators, which we address further below), the “knowledge” analysis will most
likely focus on whether the defendant had knowledge that the source to which it
linked was unauthorized. Because, in most instances, the actor’s knowledge of the
infringing nature of the linked-to source has been obvious from the factual record,
courts so far have not needed to grapple with this criterion.196
In cases in which the defendant’s knowledge of the infringing nature of the source
is not so clear, litigants may argue that a court should presume knowledge of the
infringing nature of the linked-to source.197 In several cases, plaintiffs have argued
that identifying characteristics of a website or the nature and format of the
copyrighted work itself should form the basis of a presumption that the defendant
knew or should have known that facilitating access to that website constituted the
facilitation of copyright infringement. For example, in EMI Christian Music Group,

195. See supra section III.B.2.b (addressing inducement of infringement).
196. For example, in Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 9 F. Supp. 3d 328, 337–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),
the court could safely assume that the defendant knew that the hyperlink in question linked to an infringing
source because the defendant was in the business of selling unauthorized copies of educational materials;
and in Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294–95 (D. Utah
1999), the defendants clearly knew that the linked to materials were infringing because they had previously
posted the materials to their own website and were ordered to remove them on the basis of copyright
infringement.
197. In the U.S., presumptions of knowledge of the infringing nature of the work are typically based
on the nature of and circumstances surrounding the allegedly infringing act—U.S. courts have not adopted
a presumption of knowledge of the infringing nature of the work based solely on the commercial nature
of the defendant’s acts. Compare Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Neth. BV, at 6 (Sept.
8, 2016), https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6 (“[W]hen the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can
be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure that the work
concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be
presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and
the possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the copyright holder.”).
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Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, a copyright owner argued that defendant knew, or should
have known, that the songs shared on its online music service were infringing and
unauthorized.198 In that case, the Second Circuit held that the jury could reasonably
conclude that the evidence presented at trial proved that the defendant “knew that
major music labels generally had not even authorized their music to be distributed in
the format most widely available” on defendant’s platform, and that this supported a
finding that the defendant had “knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the infringing
nature of” certain well-known songs shared on its platform.199 However, in Perfect
10 v. CCBill LLC, a copyright owner made a similar argument, and asked the court
to presume that a web-hosting provider knew that it was facilitating infringing
activity by providing services to websites with domain names which hinted that the
sites’ infringing nature (e.g. “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com”). 200 The
court disagreed, holding that the incriminating names “may [have been] an attempt
to increase their salacious appeal” and reasoned that the defendant may have been
justified to assume that the incriminating names were not “an admission that the
photographs [contained on the websites were] actually illegal or stolen.”201
However, in the context of hyperlinking, it may be easier for a court to presume
that a linker knew of the infringing nature of the linked-to work. First, in some cases,
one may presume the infringing character of the linked-to site from the nature of the
copyrighted work contained on the site.202 For example, a site offering a stream of
a newly released film for free may be presumed to be unauthorized simply because,
as a matter of public knowledge, such works are not offered to the public for free by
their copyright owners. Second, the copyright owner could notify the defendant of
the infringing nature of the work to which the defendant links with a notice, which

198. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2016).
199. Id. at 92–93. Note that this reasoning was a part of an analysis of whether the defendant
qualified for safe harbor under § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and did not
concern whether the defendant was liable as a contributory infringer. However, the analysis of § 512 safe
harbor liability is closely related to the analysis of secondary liability. See infra Section IV.B.
200. Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007).
201. Id. Similarly, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 644 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), the copyright holder argued that the defendant, the provider of an online website that aggregated
links to websites through which users could download mp3 files of songs, should be presumed to have
known about the infringing nature of the sites which its website linked to simply because some of the
linked-to websites used the terms “free,” “mp3,” or “file-sharing” in their domain names. The court
rejected this argument, finding that “those terms are ubiquitous among legitimate sites offering legitimate
services.” Id. Note that the courts’ analysis in both Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC and Capitol Records, Inc.
v. MP3tunes, LLC, like the court’s analysis in EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC,
concerned the defendant’s eligibility for DMCA safe harbor, and did not concern the knowledge
requirement under the contributory liability doctrine.
202. See, e.g., EMI Christian Music Grp. v. MP3tunes , 844 F.3d at 92–93 (concluding that evidence
that the defendant “knew that major music labels generally had not even authorized their music to be
distributed in the format” through which defendant’s file sharing platform helped to distribute songs was
sufficient to conclude that the defendants had “knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the infringing
nature of the” the songs on its servers); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 546–
49 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that “a reasonable juror could—but need not—find that the infringing [nature
of videos uploaded to a video hosting site containing well known songs] was ‘objectively’ obvious to a
reasonable person”).
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may suffice to meet the knowledge requirement under the contributory liability
analysis.203
b. Inducement of Infringement
Liability for inducement of infringement is a variant of contributory infringement,
whose elements the U.S. Supreme Court detailed in a case involving the liability of
operators of P2P platforms: (1) “[e]vidence of active steps taken to encourage direct
infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in
an infringing use,” e.g. “aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement,” (2) failing to attempt to “diminish the infringing activity,” and (3)
building a business model that is structured around infringing use. 204 In a case
concerning inducement liability of the operator of a BitTorrent “tracker” platform,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant had “active[ly]
encourag[ed] the uploading of [infringing] torrent files,” “acted with a purpose to
cause copyright violations by the use of” its service, “took no steps to . . . diminish
the infringing activity,” and ran a business model based on benefitting from
infringing activity.205 One significant difference between liability for supplying the
means to infringe (through traditional contributory or vicarious liability) and liability
for inducement concerns the level of required knowledge. While U.S. courts have
demanded a showing of specific knowledge regarding the works whose infringement
the defendant facilitated,206 in the case of inducement, by contrast, U.S. courts have
ruled that proof of intent to promote infringement sufficed to make out the violation,
without requiring that the defendant knew precisely which works would be infringed.
The inducement of infringement doctrine is likely to prove most useful when the
link at issue leads to a site on which multiple works are accessible (i.e. a website
which aggregates links to online sources of infringing copies of film or television
content). Plaintiffs who fail to prove that the defendant-linker had particularized
knowledge of the specific works accessible on that site may still succeed if they can
203. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 3205399 at *7 (N.D. Ill. July
27, 2011) (holding that “we . . . have no doubt that defendants knew or should have known” of the
infringing nature of the works which the defendants facilitated access to because the copyright owner
“sent at least seven DMCA notices that identified specific infringing files” and sent several emails
informing the defendant of the infringing nature of the files). The sending of these “take-down” notices
implicates the issue of whether the defendant can claim safe harbor under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, which is addressed below. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (holding that a “service provider shall
not be liable [for copyright infringement] by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online
location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using . . . hyperlink text . . . if the service
provider . . . (1)(C) upon obtaining [knowledge that the material or activity is infringing], acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material”). Therefore, by sending a notice to the linker,
the copyright owner may be able to (1) ensure that the defendant must either take the link down or face
disqualification from the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, and (2) ensure that she will be able to prove
that the defendant had knowledge of the infringing nature of the linked-to source for purposes of proving
affirmative liability.
204. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005).
205. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2013).
206. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439, 487–89
(1984); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–22, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004).
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show that the defendant-linker “active[ly] encourage[d]” the infringement, “acted
with a purpose to cause copyright violations” through the provision if the link, “took
no steps to . . . diminish the infringing activity” by removing the link, and ran a
business model based on benefitting from the infringing activity which was
facilitated by the link at issue.207
In many instances, then, doctrines of secondary liability will cover much of the
ground left open by U.S. copyright law’s exclusion of direct liability for
hyperlinking. But, in the online context, both direct and secondary liability claims
now encounter assertions of service provider immunity under the 1998 Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitations Act. To determine what secondary
liability claims for hyperlinking might survive the act’s liability preclusions, we now
address the terms and implementation of the statutory “safe harbors.”
C. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND SAFE HARBOR UNDER
U.S. LAW
Remedies in the United States for copyright infringement by means of
hyperlinking may also depend on the applicability of several safe harbor provisions,
which, like the E.U. eCommerce Directive, 208 provide immunity from copyright
infringement under certain circumstances. The United States enacted the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998, which includes several provisions
designed to “create a series of ‘safe harbors[]’ for certain common activities of
service providers.”209 Through these safe harbor provisions, titled “Limitations on
liability relating to material online,” Congress sought to provide “greater certainty to
service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur
in the course of their activities.”210 As the Senate report indicates, in acknowledging
the occurrence of infringements and the resulting “legal exposure,” the DMCA safe
harbor provisions do not in fact exclude liability for copyright infringement but
instead limit the remedies available against defendants for both direct and secondary
copyright infringement.211
The law creates four safe harbors which allow qualifying “service providers”
immunity from claims of copyright infringement: subsection 512(a) establishes a
safe harbor for “transitory digital network communications” (which applies to
providers of Internet access); subsection 512(b) establishes a safe harbor for “system
caching” (or temporary storage of material); subsection 512(c) establishes a safe
harbor for “information residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of users”
(which generally applies to websites that store information provided by users); and

207. Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1036–37.
208. Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at 16.
209. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998). The safe harbor provisions passed with the DMCA are
separately referred to as The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA). See 17
U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d).
210. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
211. Id. at 40 (“The limitations in [§ 512] subsections (a) through (d) protect qualifying service
providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement.”).
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subsection 512(d) establishes a safe harbor for “information location tools” (such as
links to content on other sites, typically applied to search engines).212
Subsections 512(a) and (b) will not apply to hyperlinking liability cases because
these provisions limit remedies only with respect to infringements occurring “by
reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material
through a system or network,” (§ 512(a)) “by reason of the intermediate and transient
storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing
connections,” (§ 512(a)) or “by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of
material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider”
(§ 512(b)). Additionally, because section 512(c) applies only to service providers
who may be liable for infringement of copyright “by reason of the storage . . . of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider,” this provision may be equally unhelpful to defendants who are
facing liability for linking to material stored on a third-party server.213
Subsection 512(d), however, shields the service provider from awards of damages
for copyright infringement “by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an
online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or
hyperlink text.”214 When passing this provision, Congress noted that “information
location tools are essential to the operation of the internet” because they enable users
to “find the information they need.”215 The legislative history specifically refers to
search engines and online directories like Yahoo! as examples of information
location tools covered by the act, and noted that the “human judgment and editorial
discretion exercised by [directory-based information location tools]” makes these
services valuable.216

212. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 233, 235 (2009).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (emphasis supplied). However, a defendant who both hyperlinks and
engages in other functions which could fall under the other DMCA safe harbor provisions may claim the
protection of multiple safe harbor provisions. 17 U.S.C. § 512(n); see also S. REP. NO. 105-90, at 55
(“Consider, for example, a service provider that provides a hyperlink to a site containing infringing
material which it then caches on its system in order to facilitate access to it by its users. This service
provider is engaging in at least three functions that may be subject to the limitation on liability: transitory
digital network communications under subsection (a), system caching under subsection (b), and
information location tools under subsection (d).”).
214. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
215. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 58 (1998).
216. Id. Some commentators have noted that this legislative history may support the argument that
the application of § 512(d) is limited to providers of search engines or directories. See Anjali Dalal,
Protecting Hyperlinks and Preserving First Amendment Values on the Internet, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1017, 1072 (2011) (noting that the definition of “service provider” and the scope of § 512(d) is expansive,
but the legislative history’s specific discussion of online directories may be “somewhat more limiting”).
But see Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097–98 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that § 512(d) is limited to websites “which provide links to millions of websites with
whom it has no relationship,” and acknowledging that § 512(d) could apply to a website which “merely
links to a relatively small universe of websites with whom it has in place contractual relationships and
established review procedures”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007);
Amy Blom, Search Engines and § 512(d) of the D.M.C.A., 1 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET
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Very few cases in the U.S. have dealt with the applicability of the DMCA’s safe
harbor provisions to claims for copyright infringement based on hyperlinks, posted
by the defendant, to copyrighted material. The majority of cases involving the §
512(d) safe harbor provision involve defendants who provide online platforms on
which users post hyperlinks.217 Most § 512(d) cases concerning defendants who
themselves provided the links at issue involved defendants who operate search
engines and online directories, similar to the actors contemplated in the DMCA’s
legislative history.218 However, in a few instances, courts have applied § 512(d) to
defendants who do not provide search engines or directories, but who instead simply
provide a handful of hyperlinks to websites, some of which may have contained
infringing material.219
1. Basic Requirements for Qualification for DMCA Safe Harbor under § 512
Because the DMCA safe harbors provide affirmative defenses, the burden of
proof is on the defendant to establish compliance with the statutory requirements for
safe harbor qualification. 220 Several requirements apply to any party seeking to
claim safe harbor under the DMCA.
First, the party must establish that it is a “service provider” as defined by the
statute.221 The statute defines the term “service provider” (for the purposes of §
512(b)–(d)) as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of
facilities therefor.” 222 This definition is “intended to encompass a broad set of
Internet entities”223 and most likely covers any website on the Internet.224

36, 44–45 (2009) (“[A]lthough large search engines and directories like Google or Yahoo! seem to be
what Congress had in mind when it passed the law, this safe-harbor might apply even if a search engine
hosts a small number of links and has some form of contractual relationship with linked third-party sites.”).
217. See, e.g., Totally Her Media, LLC v. BWP Media USA, Inc., No. CV1308379ABPLAX, 2015
WL 12659912, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (holding that a defendant which provides a “web-based
social media and community discussion forum” which “contains substantial amounts of user-generated
content, including user-generated links to outside content” was protected from copyright liability under §
512(d)); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing and
ultimately rejecting the § 512(d) safe harbor claim brought by the defendant who operated a torrent-based
file sharing platform).
218. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04–9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 9479059, at
*13 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (holding that Google was entitled to safe harbor under § 512(d) for a subset
of the claims at issue, and was therefore partially shielded from liability for providing hyperlinks through
its search engine to websites which hosted unauthorized copies of plaintiff’s copyrighted works).
219. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1083, 1097–98 (applying § 512(d) safe harbor to
a website that provides age verification services to adult websites by asking users who wish to visit those
websites to verify their age and then providing those users with a link to websites which allegedly
contained infringing material); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1179–
83 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying § 512(d) in a similar case, but denying safe harbor because of deficiencies
in the defendant’s compliance with the qualification requirements).
220. Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1039; WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 2012).
221. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
223. Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012).
224. One court commented that the definition of “service provider” is so broad that the court “[had]
trouble imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall under the definitions.” In re
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Second, the party must have “adopted and reasonably implemented, and
inform[ed] subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or
network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances
of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who
are repeat infringers.”225 This provision has three basic requirements: first, a service
provider must “adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service access for
repeat infringers,” second, a service provider must “inform users of the service
policy,” and third, the service provider must “implement the policy in a reasonable
manner.” 226 The application of this “repeat infringer policy” requirement to
hyperlinking cases is not clear. The statute protects service providers who offer
platforms that other parties may use to infringe copyrighted works (i.e. video hosting
platforms, to use a commonly litigated example). The repeat infringer policy seems
designed specifically to ensure that “those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their
access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others”
are informed by service providers that their access may be revoked if the infringing
activity continues.227
The framework of the DMCA’s “repeat offender policy” requirement seems
inapplicable to a case in which a website seeks DMCA safe harbor to immunize itself
from copyright liability for its provision of a link to a website with which the
defendant does not have a pre-existing relationship. In such cases, there are no
“subscribers or account holders” to “inform . . . of the service policy.”228 Courts
have held that when a defendant is claiming DMCA safe harbor for a service that
lacks “account holders or subscribers,” simply providing proof that the defendant has
a “system for receiving and processing notifications” is sufficient to meet the “repeat
offender policy” requirement.229 Thus, this requirement may not apply in full force
to hyperlinking cases, as long as the defendant complies with the notice-andtakedown procedures for dealing with DMCA notifications.230

Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 658 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original); see also Sam Bayard, Embedded Video and Copyright Infringement, DIGITAL
MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Jul. 10, 2007), https://perma.cc/MFL3-9FJW (“The plain language of § 512(d)
seems to provide bloggers and website operators who embed infringing video content with a means for
avoiding liability.”).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
226. Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
227. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998).
228. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A); Wolk, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
229. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 9479059, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. July 26, 2010) (“Google has provided evidence that it has a system for receiving and processing
notifications . . . Moreover, Google points out . . . that [its] Web Search [and] Image Search [products] do
not have account holders or subscribers, . . . and [plaintiff] does not contend that Google must, or even
can, have a repeat infringer policy for these services.”).
230. See supra discussion of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). See also Miquel Peguera, When the Cached
Link Is the Weakest Link: Search Engine Caches Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 589, 614 (2009) (arguing that the § 512(d) “repeat offender policy” requirement
may not apply to search engines which “lack . . . subscribers or account holders”).
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Third, the party must “not interfere with standard technical measures used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.”231 The statute defines
“standard technical measures” as “technical measures” that:
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service
providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; (B) are available
to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or
networks.232

However, as of 2017, this provision has not been used to disqualify a service provider
from DMCA safe harbor because of the lack of a “broad consensus” regarding the
definition of “standard technical measures.”233
2. Specific Requirements for Qualification for Safe Harbor Under § 512(d)
Sections 512(c) and (d) of the DMCA impose additional qualification
requirements on host and search engine service providers who seek safe harbor under
those provisions. These provisions require that the service providers do not have
actual or “red flag” knowledge of the infringing nature of the material to which the
service provider facilitates or provides access, that the service providers do not
“receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity,”234 and
that the service provider complies with the notice-and-takedown procedures laid out
in § 512(c) by “responding expeditiously to remove, or disable access to” material
once that material is identified in a “notification of claimed infringement” provided
to the service provider.235
Actual or “Red Flag” Knowledge Requirement—Sections 512(c)(1)(A) and
512(d)(1) require that the defendant seeking safe harbor under § 512(c) or (d) prove

231. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2).
233. See U.S. Copyright Office, Section 512 Study: Request for Additional Comments, 81 Fed. Reg.
78636, 78641 (Nov. 8, 2016) (“[S]ince passage of the DMCA, no standard technical measures have been
adopted pursuant to section 512(i).”); Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (rejecting plaintiffs’
argument that the defendant’s privacy settings “prevent copyright owners from collecting information
needed to issue a takedown notice” constitutes the failure to implement a ‘standard technical measure’
because privacy settings are not a “standard technical measure,” and while privacy settings “may be
relevant to other provisions of the DMCA . . . privacy settings do not constitute interference with standard
technical measures”).
234. In the linking context, defendants will rarely have the “right and ability” to control the
infringing activity of the unauthorized sites they link to. See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 117374 (2007) (holding that Google’s right to terminate a particular website’s advertising contract “does not
give Google the right to stop direct infringement” because “an infringing third-party website can continue
to reproduce, display, and distribute its infringing copies of [plaintiff’s] copyrighted works after its”
contract with Google ended, and thus Google could not be found liable as a vicarious infringer).
Therefore, this provision is not immediately relevant to our analysis.
235. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d).
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the absence of actual or “red flag” knowledge of the infringing nature of the activity
at issue.236 The defendant:
(A) [must] not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; (B) in
the absence of such actual knowledge, [must not be] aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent [i.e. “red flag” knowledge]; or (C) upon
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material.237

This provision parallels the analysis of affirmative liability under contributory
liability analysis; at first blush, a defendant who possesses actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringing nature of the facilitated activity would under
contributory liability doctrine accordingly fail to qualify for the § 512(c)(1)(A) or §
512(d)(1) safe harbor.238
Courts construing the DMCA, however, have underscored a difference between
common law standards of contributory liability and the statutory regime under the
DMCA. 239 Importantly, the statutory language of the DMCA includes both “a
subjective and an objective element”—the defendant can be disqualified from the
safe harbor if the plaintiff can show that the defendant had either “actual knowledge
that the material or activity is infringing” (the subjective element) or “aware[ness] of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” (the objective
element).240 The Second Circuit has clarified that “the actual knowledge provision
turns on whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific
infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was
subjectively aware of facts that would have made specific infringement “objectively”

236. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A), (d)(1).
237. Id.
238. Some commentators have noted that “the threshold requirements for [DMCA] immunity
closely track the traditional elements of secondary liability.” Ginsburg, Sony Sheep, supra note 190 at
591. See also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1371–72 (2004) (noting that the DMCA’s safe harbor
provisions “essentially mirror[]” the tests for contributory and vicarious liability and therefore offer “little
protection to innovators against secondary liability claims”). But see Amy Blom, supra note 216, at 48–
49 (“[F]or contributory infringement purposes, the ‘fatal’ knowledge imputed by courts might be a
somewhat less stringent standard than the actual or constructive knowledge required for a search engine
to lose its safe-harbor treatment under § 512(d)(1)(A-B).”).
239. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the lower court’s argument that the defendant’s potential “liability for contributory and vicarious
infringement renders the [safe harbor provisions of the] Digital Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable
per se”); Lemley & Reese, supra note 238, at 1372 n.102 (“The standard of knowledge that a provider
must have to fall outside the protections of the safe harbor may be somewhat higher than the standard
required in an ordinary action for contributory infringement, so the safe harbor may offer some
incremental protection even against claims of contributory infringement.”).
240. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998) (“The “red flag” test has both a subjective
and an objective element. In determining whether the service provider was aware of a “red flag,” the
subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be determined.
However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a “red flag”—in other words,
whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or
similar circumstances—an objective standard should be used.”).
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obvious to a reasonable person.”241 However, under either standard, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had subjective or objective knowledge of specific
instances of infringement, rather than a mere “general awareness that there are
infringements”—courts have labeled this as the “specificity requirement.” 242
Therefore, the DMCA standard may require plaintiffs to prove more than they would
otherwise have to prove to meet the knowledge standard under contributory liability
analysis. Rather than proving that defendant knew, or should have known of the facts
and circumstances making infringement obvious, the plaintiff must prove actual,
subjective knowledge of those facts and circumstances to disqualify a defendant from
safe harbor under the DMCA’s “red flag” knowledge standard. One commentator
noted that, absent proof of subjective “actual” knowledge of infringing material,
“[red flag] knowledge can never be found unless a plaintiff produces evidence which
can demonstrate both the specificity of infringing material as well as a clear
indication of the content’s illicit nature.”243
Courts also point to § 512(m), which bars courts from requiring that a service
provider “monitor[] its service or affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing
activity”244 to limit the grounds on which a defendant can be disqualified from §
512(c) safe harbor on the basis of “red flag” knowledge. Because of the explicit “no
monitoring obligation” language in the DMCA, the protections of the DMCA safe
harbor may be broader than the affirmative liability standard under contributory
liability doctrine—in other words, it may be possible for a defendant to qualify for
safe harbor under § 512(c) or (d) even when that defendant might otherwise have
been found liable for contributory infringement.
A comparison between the cases A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 245 and
Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC 246 illustrates the differences between the
contributory liability “knowledge” analysis and the § 512(c)/(d) “knowledge”
analysis. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, record companies and music publishers
sued Napster, an Internet service that allowed the peer-to-peer transmission of digital
audio files. The court ruled that Napster had “both actual and constructive”

241. Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis supplied).
242. Id. at 30-31 (quoting Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). See also id. at 31 (“The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between
specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard.”). Courts
have noted that this “specificity requirement” can be implied from the removal provisions of the DMCA,
which require providers to “act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material” once learning
of its infringing nature. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), 512(d)(1)(C); Viacom Intern. Inc., 676 F.3d at
30 (“[T]he nature of the removal obligation itself contemplated knowledge or awareness of specific
infringing material, because expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with
particularity which items to remove.”).
243. Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An Analysis of the Knowledge Theory Under §
512(c)’s Safe Harbor & the Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 85, 141 (2013).
244. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1); see also Viacom Intern., Inc., 676 F.3d at 41 (“[T]he safe harbor
expressly disclaims any affirmative monitoring requirement—except to the extent that such monitoring
comprises a ‘standard technical measure’ within the meaning of § 512(i).”).
245. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
246. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).
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knowledge of the direct infringements that its platform enabled. The Ninth Circuit
found that Napster had actual knowledge of direct infringement because (1) Napster
maintained a directory of all the files shared on its system which gave it the ability
to “learn of specific infringing material available on [its] system,”247 and (2) because
several documents introduced to the record conclusively showed that Napster
executives had been informed of some specific infringing files which were available
on its system, and had full knowledge that its users were “exchanging pirated
music.”248 The court further agreed with the lower court’s finding that Napster had
constructive knowledge of direct infringement, based on its observations
that “(a) Napster executives have recording industry experience; (b) they have
enforced intellectual property rights in other instances; (c) Napster executives have
downloaded copyrighted songs from the system; and (d) they have promoted the site
with ‘screen shots listing infringing files.’” 249 In other words, knowledge that
Napster executives were generally aware that mass infringement occurred on their
platform, combined with Napster’s clear ability to identify infringing activity
through its central directory, was sufficient to support a claim of contributory
liability.
In Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 250 a group of record companies and
music publishers sued Vimeo, an online video sharing platform, asserting that Vimeo
was hosting infringing content on its platform. Vimeo claimed safe harbor under §
512(c).251 The plaintiffs had presented evidence that some of Vimeo’s employees
had watched and interacted with some videos which contained “all or substantially
all” of recognizable copyrighted songs, and argued that this should disqualify Vimeo
from § 512(c) safe harbor because the evidence established Vimeo’s possession of
“red flag” knowledge of the infringing content. The plaintiffs also presented
evidence that Vimeo employees knew that many of the videos on the platform
contained infringing content (this evidence was very similar to the evidence
presented in the Napster case), and that Vimeo employees had, “in order to expand
its business, actively encouraged users to post videos containing infringing
material.” 252 Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that Vimeo had monitored videos for
infringement of visual content, but had declined to monitor its videos for
infringement of audio content, which proved that Vimeo at least had the technical
ability to identify specific infringing material.253 The court rejected these arguments
and found that the evidence presented was insufficient to show that Vimeo was
disqualified from claiming § 512(c) safe harbor. The court reasoned that § 512(m)
247. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
248. Id. at 1020 n.5 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D.
Cal. 2000)).
249. Id.
250. 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016)
251. Id. at 81.
252. Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. Vimeo, L.L.C., 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting
evidence that Vimeo employees had sent emails internally indicating that the company “[i]gnor[es]” the
fact that many videos on the platform use copyrighted material, and noting that another employee had
responded to a question regarding Vimeo’s copyright policy by telling a user “[d]on’t ask, don’t tell;)”).
253. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98.
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“relieves the service provider of [the] obligation to monitor for infringement posted
by users on its website,” and thus Vimeo’s “awareness of facts suggesting a
likelihood of infringement” did not “requir[e] investigation merely because [Vimeo
had] learn[ed] facts raising a suspicion of infringement.”254 The court’s decision was
primarily motivated by a concern that, when designing the DMCA safe harbor
provisions, Congress had intended to “[p]rotect[] service providers from the expense
of monitoring” for infringing content.”255
Therefore, evidence that may be sufficient to support an argument of “actual or
constructive knowledge” for contributory infringement purposes may be insufficient
to disqualify a defendant from claiming the protections of DMCA safe harbor on the
basis of actual or “red flag” knowledge. In both Napster and Vimeo, the plaintiffs
had presented evidence which established (i) that the defendant had at least some
general knowledge that infringement occurred on its platform,256 and (ii) that the
defendant had the ability to identify infringing content and remove it. However,
while this evidence was sufficient to support a finding of affirmative liability in
Napster, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant was
disqualified from seeking the protections of DMCA safe harbor in Vimeo. Thus, at
least with respect to the knowledge requirement, the protections provided to service
providers under the DMCA seem to be broader than the defenses to allegations of
liability for contributory copyright infringement.
Two recent developments in DMCA case law may, however, signal that courts
are retreating from this broad reading of the safe harbor provisions. First, in Viacom
v. YouTube, the Second Circuit recognized that plaintiffs may meet the disqualifying
“knowledge” standard under the DMCA through arguments based on the doctrine of
willful blindness.257 Despite the absence of any mention of willful blindness in the
DMCA’s statutory language, the court ruled that a defendant who becomes “aware
of a high probability of [its facilitation of infringement] and consciously avoided
confirming that fact” may be disqualified from DMCA safe harbor under the actual

254. Id. at 98. See also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[I]f investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to identify material as
infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not ‘red flags.’”).
255. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98.
256. In another case, plaintiff’s evidence that showed that 75–80% of all videos on defendant’s
platform contained copyrighted material, and that “defendants were conscious that significant quantities
of material on [their] website were infringing” did not suffice, standing alone, to prove that the defendant
“actually knew, or was aware of facts or circumstances that would indicate, the existence of particular
instances of infringement” for the purposes of § 512(c) eligibility analysis. See Viacom Intern., Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 33 (2d Cir. 2012).
257. Id. at 35. After Grokster, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that that a claim for affirmative
contributory liability must rest on a showing of either actual knowledge of, or willful blindness to specific
acts of direct infringement, and that constructive knowledge or negligence will not suffice. See BMG
Rights Mgmt (US) LLC v. Cox Comm’ns Inc., No. 17-1353, 2018 WL 650316 at *8-11 (4th Cir. Feb. 1
2018). Combined with the Second Circuit’s embrace of the willful blindness theory in the context of the
knowledge standard for DMCA safe harbor analysis, see Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35, this approach implies
that the knowledge standards for affirmative liability and for safe harbor qualification are indeed parallel.
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or red flag knowledge provisions. 258 Because willful blindness is a “proxy for
knowledge,” willful blindness must too relate to “specific infringements”—in other
words, willful blindness of facts that would lead a reasonable observer to have a
generalized knowledge of infringement will not suffice to disqualify a party from
DMCA safe harbor.259
Plaintiffs may thus be able to “avoid difficulties in proving apparent knowledge”
by simply proving that the defendants were aware of the high probability of the
infringing nature of a specific facilitated act, and deliberately avoided learning
additional facts which could have confirmed the infringing nature of that act. 260
Notably, the concept underlying willful blindness may cut against a broad
interpretation of § 512(m) of the DMCA that would relieve the service provider of
any obligation to investigate specific acts of infringement.261 Accordingly, courts
have applied the willful blindness doctrine conservatively. For example, in Capitol
Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, the Second Circuit refused to apply the doctrine of
willful blindness to a defendant who had shown the ability to monitor its platform
for infringing content, but declined to monitor in a way which would reveal
infringements of plaintiff’s copyrights, even though the plaintiffs had presented
evidence that proved that the defendant was generally aware that its acts facilitated
copyright infringement.262
Second, recent case law suggests that in some circumstances, service providers
may in fact have affirmative obligations to monitor for infringing activity—and that
the “no monitoring obligations” language in § 512(m) of the DMCA forbids the
imposition only of general duties to monitor.263 In EMI Christian Music Group v.
MP3tunes, LLC, a copyright holder had produced evidence which showed that
defendants, who operated an online music service on which users posted links to mp3
files, knew (i) that their service allowed users to share mp3 versions of Beatles songs,
and (ii) that “there had been no legal online distribution of Beatles tracks before
2010.” 264 The Second Circuit concluded that the jury below was “permitted to

258. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35. See also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d
at 1116. The doctrine of willful blindness may have roots in the DMCA’s legislative history. See H.R.
REP. 105-55(II) at 57 (1998) (noting that a service provider would not qualify for safe harbor “if it had
turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement”); Columbia Pictures Inds. v. Fung, 2009 WL
6355911 at *17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (quoting this language in order to find that the defendant was
disqualified from DMCA safe harbor because he had overlooked facts which would have made specific
instances of infringement apparent).
259. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 99 (quoting Viacom Intern., 676 F.3d at 34–35).
260. Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An Analysis of the Knowledge Theory Under §
512(c)’s Safe Harbor & the Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 85, 154 (2013).
261. See, e.g., Viacom Intern., 676 F.3d at 35 (noting the tension between willful blindness doctrine
and § 512(m), and stating that while § 512(m) is “incompatible with a broad common law duty to monitor
or otherwise seek out infringing activity based on general awareness that infringement may be occurring,”
willful blindness doctrine does not necessarily impose “an affirmative duty to monitor” and thus § 512(m)
does not prevent a narrow application of the willful blindness doctrine to DMCA cases).
262. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98.
263. EMI Christian Music Group, v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 844 F.3d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 2016).
264. Id.
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conclude that [defendants had] a time-limited, targeting duty—even if encompassing
a large number of songs,” and implied that only an “amorphous” duty to monitor
constituted a “contravention of the DMCA[‘s § 512(m) provision].”265 Notably, the
Second Circuit also paid particular attention to the observation that implementing
this “time-limited, targeted duty” would be relatively easy for the defendant: the
“design of the service’s indexing feature, coupled with the readily ascertainable and
searchable nature of certain categories of infringing material” meant that the
imposition of a limited monitoring duty would not be overly burdensome.266
While these recent developments may imply that courts are reconsidering their
initially broad interpretations of the DMCA safe harbor provisions, the “no
monitoring obligation” provision (§ 512(m)) may stunt the reach of the novel
approaches based on “willful blindness” and “time-limited, targeted dut[ies].”
Therefore, while there is significant doctrinal uncertainty surrounding this issue,
when a defendant is not actually aware of the infringing nature of the facilitated
activity, is not aware of “facts making [a specific instance of] infringement
obvious,”267 and does not consciously avoid acquiring knowledge of these facts, a
plaintiff will most likely fail to disqualify the defendant from DMCA safe harbor
based on the knowledge provisions. In other words, a defendant who has only
general knowledge that its actions facilitate infringement, and who declines to
implement its ability to identify and remove specific infringing content may still
qualify for DMCA safe harbor, even though that defendant might have otherwise
been found liable under affirmative contributory liability doctrine.268
Thus, in the hyperlinking context, the analysis of a defendant’s knowledge of the
infringing nature of the linked-to source may be more defendant-friendly under the
DMCA safe harbor analysis than under general principles of contributory liability.
Because the DMCA case law establishes that the defendant is required to investigate
whether a particular facilitated act is illicit only when it learns of “facts making
infringement obvious”269 (rather than when it learns of facts that “rais[e] a suspicion
of infringement”270), it may be relatively easy for a defendant linker to claim the
benefits of the § 512(d) safe harbor as long as the defendant does not know of the
infringing nature of the linked-to source, and does not possess knowledge of (nor is

265. Id. This logic has been used to find that a service provider who ran a platform which enabled
users to upload photographs, after receiving take down notices identifying specific infringing photographs,
had a targeted duty to monitor for other “substantially similar or readily identifiable” copies of those
photographs uploaded by other users after the initial infringing images were taken down. Venus Fashions,
Inc. v. ContextLogic, Inc., 2017 WL 2901695 at *27 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18 2017) (citing EMI Christian Music
Group, 844 F.3d at 93).
266. Randi W. Singer & Jonathan Bloom, Second Circuit Examines Limits of DMCA Safe-Harbor
Protection, 29 NO. 2 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 7 (2017); EMI Christian Music Group, 844 F.3d at 93
(“[T]here was evidence at trial that MP3tunes could disable access. Indeed, an expert testified that
searching through libraries of MP3 songs was a common function of MP3tunes’s business.”).
267. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98.
268. See, e.g., supra discussion of Capitol Records, 826 F.3d 78; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
269. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98 (emphasis in original).
270. Id.
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willfully blind to) facts or circumstances which would make the infringing nature of
the linked-to source obvious to a “reasonable person.”
Moreover, the legislative history of § 512(d) indicates that courts should be
particularly careful when assuming the existence of “red flag” knowledge for the
purposes of determining whether a defendant qualifies for the “information location
tools” safe harbor under the DMCA. The House Report which accompanied the
DMCA clarified that “[t]he knowledge or awareness standard [contained in § 512(d)]
should not be applied in a manner which would create a disincentive to the
development of directories which involve human intervention” and that “[a]bsent
actual knowledge, awareness of infringement as provided in [§ 512(d)] should
typically be imputed to a directory provider only with respect to pirate sites or in
similarly obvious and conspicuous circumstances, and not simply because the
provider viewed an infringing site during the course of assembling the directory.”271
Compliance with Notice-and-Takedown Procedures—To qualify for § 512(d) safe
harbor, a party must also comply with the notice-and-takedown procedures laid out
in § 512(c)(3).272 After receiving a proper notice from a copyright holder, the party
seeking safe harbor must “respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing
activity.”273 In order for a notice to be proper, the notice must meet the detailed
statutory requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv)–(vi),274 “identif[y] . . . the reference
or link” at issue, and provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate that reference or link.”275 A notice that complies “substantially”
with these requirements may suffice to give the defendant “knowledge” of the work,
thus disqualifying it from the safe harbor if it does not remove the material at issue.276
While the § 512(c) safe harbor provision requires the party seeking safe harbor to
designate an agent “to receive notifications of claimed infringement,” § 512(d) does
not require designation of an agent.277

271. H.R. REP., supra note 258, at 58.
272. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (requiring compliance with the notice-and-takedown procedures laid out
in § 512(c)(3)).
273. Id. The statute does not define “expeditiously” and Congress noted in the DMCA legislative
history that “[b]ecause the factual circumstances and technical parameters may vary from case to case, it
is not possible to identify a uniform time limit for expeditious action.” S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 44 (1998).
274. Id. at § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv)–(vi) (requiring the notice to include a signature, contact
information of the copyright holder or its agent, a statement of “good faith belief that use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized,” and a “statement that the information in the notification
is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the
[copyright holder]”).
275. Id. at § 512(d).
276. Id. at § 512(c)(3)(B).
277. Id. at § 512(c)(2). This might not be clear from the statutory language—§ 512(d) incorporates
§ 512(c)(3), which does refer to a “designated agent.” See id. at § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) (referring to “the service
provider’s designated agent”). However, the Copyright Office takes the position that only parties seeking
safe harbor under § 512(c) need to designate an agent. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 80 FR 81862-01,
SECTION 512 STUDY: NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2015) (“A service provider seeking
to avail itself of the section 512(c) safe harbor for user-posted content is further required to designate an
agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement.”).
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After the service provider receives the notice and “remove[s], or disable[s] access
to” the identified link, § 512(g) sets out a procedure through which the service
provider may be required to replace the removed or disabled link.278 While § 512(g)
refers to § 512(c) and not § 512(d), courts have held that § 512(g) applies in equal
force to takedown procedures under § 512(d).279
However, it is unclear how the replacement procedures set out in § 512(g) apply
to § 512(d) defendants who do not have a pre-existing service relationship with a
“subscriber[] or account holder[].” § 512(g) requires that the service provider “takes
reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled
access to the material,” and then allows the “subscriber” to send a counternotification which will require the service provider to restore access to the removed
or disabled work within 10-14 days.280 However, as noted above, a defendant facing
a claim for infringement for a link that the defendant itself provided may not have
“subscribers or account holders” to notify of the removal of the particular link.281
For example, search engines and online directories seeking the § 512(d) safe harbor
(which, by some measures, elicit the majority of all DMCA takedown notices282)
may not have a pre-existing service relationship with the sites to which they link, and
thus may not have an accessible way to “notify” a website that it has removed a link
after receiving a takedown notice.283 Without a mechanism to notify the affected
websites, the DMCA’s “counter-notification and put-back” procedure, which was
designed as procedural protection for alleged infringers who may be adversely
affected by inappropriate or abusive takedown requests, may not operate effectively
in the context of many § 512(d) service providers.284

278. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
279. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1179 (C.D.Cal. 2002).
280. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)–(3).
281. In some cases, courts have implemented 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) in the context of a hyperlink
provider who is in privity with the websites to which the hyperlinks lead. For example, in Perfect 10, Inc.,
213 F. Supp. 2d at 1180, the court examined the defendant’s compliance with § 512(g) by examining the
procedure through which the defendant would restore a removed link. The defendant in that case was an
age-verification service for adult websites, and the court considered defendant’s client websites as the
“subscribers” for the purposes of determining whether the defendant had followed the counter-notification
and put-back procedures in § 512(g). However, not all providers of hyperlinks will have a relationship
with the linked-to source site, and therefore in some § 512(d) cases there may be no “subscriber” to which
the defendant must send a notification that the link has been removed.
282. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process of “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 621, 644 (2006) (noting that 59% of the DMCA notices studied from the “Chilling Effects” database
were 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) notices sent to search engines, requesting removal of a webpage from search
results).
283. Id. at 626 (“As search providers likely have no service relationship with the alleged infringer,
they rarely have the ability to notify . . . . Links to complained-of material are thus typically removed from
the search engine’s index based only on the copyright holder’s takedown notice, without any notice to the
target or other process.”).
284. Id. at 628 (referring to the counter-notification and put-back procedures as an “important
procedural protection”); id. at 684 (noting the “troubling” use of questionable takedown notices by website
operators against their competitors, and describing this practice as a “new weapon in the search-rank
wars”).
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Google claims that, after removing content from its search engine due to a
takedown notice, it “notif[ies] the administrator of the affected site through Google’s
Search Console.”285 However, not all website administrators whose websites are
included in Google’s search results utilize the “Search Console” service, which is an
opt-in analytics product.286 The Lumen removals database, a project of Harvard’s
Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, provides a creative solution to this
problem: search engines can forward takedown notices to Lumen, which publishes
these notices online and provides a simple way for website owners to file DMCA
counter-notifications. 287 Search engines can respond to a takedown notice by
breaking the link to the allegedly infringing website, and redirecting that link directly
to the page on the Lumen website on which the publication of the relevant take-down
notice appears.288 Through this process, even though a website operator may not be
affirmatively notified that her link has been removed due to a takedown notice, the
website operator may quickly learn of the removal and have an opportunity to
respond after searching for her own site on a search engine.
Some commentators have concluded that § 512(d) does not require the service
provider to notify targets of the take-down.289 While this conclusion is not clear from

285. Transparency Report: Requests to Remove Content Due to Copyright, GOOGLE (last visited
Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/22CH-SRWJ (“When we take action in response to a copyright notice,
we notify the administrator of the affected site through Google’s Search Console. Following DMCA
process, a webmaster may issue a counter notification. If they believe the content is not infringing or that
a notice has been filed in error, the administrator of an affected site or the provider of affected content
may also file a counter notification.”).
286. Search Console Help: What is Search Console?, GOOGLE (last visited Oct. 12, 2017),
https://perma.cc/N2ZV-ZDCH (“Google Search Console is a free service offered by Google that helps
you monitor and maintain your site’s presence in Google Search results. You don’t have to sign up for
Search Console for your site to be included in Google’s search results, but doing so can help you
understand how Google views your site and optimize its performance in search results.”).
287. Transparency Report, supra note 285 (“Lumen is a project of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center
for Internet & Society. Lumen works with a variety of international research partners to offer information
about the global landscape of Internet takedown requests. Lumen posts and analyzes different kinds of
requests to remove material from the Internet, including requests based on copyright claims.”). See, e.g.,
Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint, LUMEN DATABASE (last visited Oct.
12, 2017), https://perma.cc/PU9A-UD7R (publication of a takedown notice sent to Google requesting
removal of several “allegedly infringing URLs” and inviting the owner of those URLs to “[c]reate DMCA
Counter Notice”).
288. Id. (“When it is possible to do so legally, Google links from search results to the requests
published by Lumen in place of removed content.”)
289. Dena Chen, Musetta Durkee, Jared Friend & Jennifer Urban, Updating 17 U.S.C. § 512’s Notice
and Takedown Procedure for Innovators, Creators, and Consumers, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 31,
2011), https://perma.cc/8248-FAT4 (“[S]ervice providers providing information location services,
defined in § 512(d) . . . are not required to notify targets that their material is being taken down in order
to maintain safe harbor protection.”); Urban & Quilter, supra note 282, at 628 (“One important protection
for subscribers is receiving notice of the copyright holder’s complaint, which is afforded only to Internet
subscribers of hosting services under § 512(c), and not to beneficiaries or subscribers of other regulated
services, such as § 512(d) search services or § 512(a) Internet access providers.”). These commentators
apparently base this conclusion on the absence of any requirement in § 512(d) for the service provider to
“notify targets that their material is being taken down.” It is true that § 512(d) does not include this
requirement, but the absence of such a provision may not mean that § 512(d) service providers are entirely
exempt from this requirement—the requirement to “take reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber
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the statutory language, this interpretation seems consistent with the approach some
courts have followed when interpreting the § 512(i) “repeat infringer policy”
requirement as applied to service providers who could not implement it because of
their lack of “subscribers and account holders.”290 Nonetheless, the awkwardness of
applying the full notice-takedown-put-back framework to some § 512(d) contexts
raises concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of the DMCA’s procedural
protections for the spectrum of online participants who may be adversely affected by
abuse of the takedown procedures. The counter-notification and put-back procedures
may work appropriately for § 512(d) service providers who crowd-source links (i.e.,
sites which invite users to post links) or search engines who have a service
relationship with the websites to which they link (i.e. Google and its means of
communicating with linked websites through the Google Search Console tool).
However, to preserve eligibility for the § 512(d) safe harbor, websites that simply
post links to content on other websites may be forced to take down links in response
to takedown notices, and may not be able to take advantage of the DMCA’s put-back
procedures because of the lack of a pre-existing service relationship with the sites to
which they link.291
IV. COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES ON
U.S. AND E.U. HYPERLINKING LAW
A. CONSISTENCY OF NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN REGIMES WITH
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
An initial question inquires “which international norms”: should service provider
liability limitation regimes be treated as exceptions whose consistency with
international norms would be analyzed under the three-step test on which WCT art.
10 and TRIPS art. 13 condition conformity of national legislation to international
norms?292 Or should they be considered a matter of remedies, whose contours Berne
that it has removed disabled access to the material” comes from § 512(g) and similarly does not appear in
§ 512(c).
290. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 9479059 at *13 (C.D.
Cal. July 26, 2010) (“Google has provided evidence that it has a system for receiving and processing
notifications . . . Moreover, Google points out . . . that [its] Web Search [and] Image Search [products] do
not have account holders or subscribers, . . . and [plaintiff] does not contend that Google must, or even
can, have a repeat infringer policy for these services.”).
291. While it is true that the linking service provider could simply refuse to take down the link after
receiving a takedown notice, such a refusal may disqualify the service provider from § 512(d) because
that provision requires the service provider to “respond[] expeditiously to remove” the infringing link
“upon notification of claimed infringement.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3). Therefore, if the service provider
refuses to take down a link and is subsequently sued by the copyright holder, the service provider would
have to defend itself against a claim of secondary infringement without the protections of the § 512(d)
safe harbor. Because the conditions for qualifying for safe harbor may be more defendant-friendly than
the conditions for escaping affirmative liability under contributory infringement doctrine, see supra notes
239–268 and accompanying text, this may disadvantage defendants who refuse to remove allegedly
infringing links after receiving a valid takedown notice.
292. See WCT, supra note 6, art. 10, ¶ 1 (“Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation,
provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under
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art. 5(2), by providing that “the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his
rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is
claimed,” leaves to member state determination?293 Classifying these regimes as
exceptions may condemn them to conflict with international norms because it is
difficult to see how a regime that applies to all copyrighted works could be
characterized as limited to “certain special cases” (step one of the three-step test).294
The WTO dispute resolution panel interpreting the first step has stated that “an
exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative
sense” and “a limitation or exception in national legislation should be clearly defined
and should be narrow in its scope and reach.”295 Service provider liability limitations
may be “clearly defined” in that they cover all copyrighted works, but by the same
token their reach is extremely broad. If, as the WTO Panel held, an exception that
does not pass the first step will fail the test as a whole, an exception that exceeds the
scope of the first step is fatally flawed. 296
To avoid this result, one might interpret the first step to accommodate application
of an exception to a broad class of works, so long as the purpose of the exception
were very constricted, but given the significance of internet communications, a
purpose of immunizing service providers from liability does not seem very narrow,
either. On the other hand, the specific prerequisites to the immunity might be deemed
sufficient to narrow the uses subject to the exemption. Failing acceptance of that
limiting construction, another way to salvage service provider liability limitations
would reject the WTO Panel’s seriatim approach to the three-step test (“Failure to
comply with any one of the three conditions results in the Article 13 exception being
disallowed”),297 and balance all steps into a general inquiry into market harm and
social benefit.298 This approach essentially ignores the tripartite treaty formulation,

this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”); See also Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (“Members
shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder.”).
293. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 2.
294. See TRIPS, supra note 292.
295. Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶¶ 6.109, 6.112, WTO
Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000).
296. Id. at ¶ 6.97 (“The three conditions apply on a cumulative basis, each being a separate and
independent requirement that must be satisfied. Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions
results in the Article 13 exception being disallowed.”).
297. Id.
298. Much has been written on competing approaches to the three-step test. See generally, MARTIN
SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST (2004); Christophe Geiger et al.,
Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 707 (2008) (arguing that the three-step test “should be interpreted
so as to ensure a proper and balanced application of limitations and exceptions”); Wittem Group,
European Copyright Code, 1 JIPITEC 123 (2010), https://perma.cc/7ELJ-BYLL (proposing an alternate
approach based allowing exceptions “provided that the corresponding requirements of the relevant
limitation are met and the use does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does not

GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018)

216

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[41:2

as well as the treaty command that exceptions and limitations should be
“confined,”299 but has the “advantage” of creating a standard so vague that service
provider liability limitations of the kind we have seen might conceivably pass muster.
Even an approach that melds the three steps into one, or balances them against each
other, might nonetheless prove dubious in the case of deep and in-line links because
these may well conflict with a normal exploitation of the work by substituting the
linker’s advertising for a lawful source page’s advertisements. Moreover, because
the service provider will not be liable in damages, there is no remuneration right to
compensate for the use under the third step.
The U.S. approach appears more compatible with international norms than the
E.U.’s because § 512 does not contest the existence of direct or indirect liability of
service providers for copyright infringement. Instead, it narrows the remedies
available against infringing service providers to injunctive relief. The exclusion of
damages against service providers arguably comes within the leeway Berne allows
member states. While the Berne Convention specifies minimum remedies only with
respect to infringing importation,300 the TRIPS Accord, art. 45(1), requires member
states to provide damages remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights,
but only if the infringer knew or “had reasonable grounds to know” of the
infringement.301 Since the § 512 safe harbors apply only to linkers who neither knew
nor had “red flag” knowledge of infringement, TRIPS would not require awards of
damages in the case of copyright infringement by reason of the acts covered by the
limitation on remedies.302 By contrast, where TRIPS does mandate the availability
of a damages remedy, that is, when the defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringement, damages against the service provider remain
available under U.S. law.

unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or rightholder, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties”).
299. See WCT, supra note 6, art. 10; See also TRIPS, supra note 292, art. 13 (“Members shall
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.”).
300. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 16.
301. TRIPS, supra note 292, art. 45(1) (“1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order
the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has
suffered because of an infringement of that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer who
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.”). Commentators have
interpreted this provision to require “[k]nowledge (or reasonable grounds to know) by the infringer that
the activity was infringing.” DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 582 (4th ed. 2012) (interpreting TRIPS art. 45(1)) (emphasis supplied). See also Sascha
Vander, Commentary on TRIPS Article 45, in WTO -TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 718, 720 (Peter-Tobias Stoll, Jan Busche & Katrin Arend, eds., 2009) (interpreting the
knowledge provision in TRIPS art. 45 to mean “knowledge or reasonable grounds to know . . . that the
activity was infringing” and noting that in most circumstances, knowledge can be “assumed . . . where
offences have been committed by the infringer after having received a warning from the right holder”).
302. Arguably “reasonable grounds to know” would encompass a greater range of actors than those
with “red flag” knowledge as currently interpreted by U.S. courts, but U.S. courts in the future might
interpret that standard harmoniously with the international norm.
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The U.S. safe harbors thus may well fit within the Berne scheme, while the E.U.
regime, as a system of exceptions from liability rather than limitations on remedies,
might not. But since the E.U. regime largely operates like the U.S. regime, providing
for de facto private injunctions through the notice and takedown procedure, and for
judicial injunctions by virtue of art. 8(3) of the Information Society Directive,
condemning one while upholding the other seems an exercise in pure formalism.303
Perhaps the E.U. provisions, albeit labeled as prerequisites to non-liability, would
better be conceptualized as limitations on remedies, and treated functionally as
“means of redress” falling under art. 5(2) rather than the three-step test for
exceptions.
Alternatively, one might revisit the permissible contours of exceptions and
limitations. If the three-step test constrains the scope of exceptions to Berne-WCTTRIPS minimum rights, it becomes necessary to consider the Berne-WCT-TRIPS
minimum remedies accompanying those rights. Putting together the relevant
provisions, TRIPS obliges member states to protect the right of communication to
the public, 304 and requires availability of injunctive relief, 305 but mandates
availability of monetary relief only if the infringer knowingly engaged in the
infringing activity.306 In other words, TRIPS allows, but does not compel, member
states to afford a damages remedy to innocent infringers of the right of
communication to the public.307 It is therefore possible to argue that the eCommerce

303. Article 12(3) of the eCommerce Directive also provides that Member States may provide for
injunctive relief to “terminate or prevent an infringement.” See Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art.
12(3); Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Entertainment (Sept. 15, 2016) at ¶ 79,
https://perma.cc/5324-W6ML (noting that Article 12 of Directive 2000/31 “must be interpreted as
meaning that it does not preclude . . . a person from claiming injunctive relief against the continuation of
. . . infringement . . . [facilitated by a] provider whose services were used in that infringement where such
claims are made for the purposes of obtaining, or follow the grant of injunctive relief by a national
authority or court to prevent that service provider from allowing the infringement to continue”).
304. TRIPS, supra note 292, art. 9 (mandating compliance with Berne Convention arts. 1-21). To
the extent the WCT making available right institutes prerogatives that go beyond the Berne
communication to the public right, rather than merely clarifying the pre-existing scope of the
communication to the public right, TRIPS might not require the provision of monetary or injunctive relief
in the event of a violation of a Berne+ right. On the other hand, art. 19 of Berne, which TRIPS does
incorporate, requires member States to extend to works from other Berne member States any greater
protection the country of protection provides. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 19. Arguably, TRIPS
minimum remedies could apply to violations of Berne+ rights through the back door of art. 19.
305. See TRIPS, supra note 292, art. 44.
306. Id. art. 45.
307. TRIPS mandates no remedies for violations of the right of communication to the public beyond
the scope of that right as articulated in the 1971 Paris text. The right of making available was introduced
in the 1996 WIPO Copyright treaties, which post-date TRIPS. WCT, supra note 6, art. 8. If the making
available right is a “new” right, then it falls outside TRIPS. Whether the right is in fact “new,” or rather
a clarification of the pre-existing Berne right, is a matter of some controversy. See REINBOTHE & VON
LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at 127 (noting that “the making available right was considered to be an aspect of
the communication right”); See also SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
POLICY 458 (2008) (“Under the WCT, the right of making available has been made a part of the right of
communication to the public.”); See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making Available
to the Public, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM
R. CORNISH 234, 246 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he core concept of ‘making available,’ . . . can fairly be
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Directive’s liability limitation provisions, read together with the Information Society
Directive’s imposition of injunctive relief against intermediary service providers, are
not an exception or limitation at all under TRIPS art. 13, because the E.U. texts do
not in fact derogate from an international obligation.
B. COMPARISON OF E.U. AND U.S. RULES ON LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING
1. Lack of Liability for Linking to an Authorized Public Source
Both the U.S. and the E.U. regimes generally preclude liability for hyperlinking
to an authorized source on the Internet. In Svensson, the CJEU held that even though
hyperlinks are a “making available” and thus a “communication to the public,” a
hyperlink that merely offers to re-communicate a work from a source authorized by
the right holder who has made the work available to all Internet users (i.e. without
technical restrictions or paywalls) is not “covered by the concept of ‘communication
to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29,”308 because
it does not make the work available to a public the right holder did not take into
account in the initial authorized communication. The CJEU expanded this “new
public” principle to in-line links in BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes. 309
Therefore, any hyperlink to an unrestricted site on which a copyrighted work has
been published with proper authorization cannot constitute an actionable
“communication to the public” because such a hyperlink does not communicate the
work to a “new public.”
Similarly, Perfect 10 v. Amazon's “server rule” in the U.S., to the extent it
continues to be followed,310 would lead courts to reject copyright holders’ claims that
a link to an authorized publication of their work constitutes a violation of rights under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act.311 Under the “server rule,” a hyperlink of any type
cannot constitute a direct infringement of copyright unless the linker “store[s] and
serve[s]” the copyrighted work from its own server - any liability for linking would
be a matter of secondary infringement. 312 But because those claims require an
underlying act of direct infringement,313 a secondary infringement claim based on a
hyperlink to an authorized source will fail.314
called neither a reaffirmation nor a novelty,” because it resolves ambiguities surrounding the Berne
communication to the public right).
308. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, at ¶ 24 (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE.
309. Case C-348/13, BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes, (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://perma.cc/6KZN-L7A9.
310. See supra note 99 for a discussion of cases in which U.S. courts have declined to follow the
server rule.
311. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
312. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843-44 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
313. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“[B]oth contributory and vicarious infringements require someone to have directly infringed the
copyright.”); Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1169.
314. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining this point, and noting that some U.S.
plaintiffs have made the unsuccessful argument that by enabling an automatic download of a copyrighted
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The two regimes reach the result through different reasoning, but the result seems
to reflect widespread concerns about the adverse consequences of imposing
copyright liability on actors who innocently link to authorized content on the
Internet, and to reflect a broader recognition of the importance of hyperlinks to the
functioning of the Internet as a whole.315 On the other hand, this result both favors
free riding by in-line linkers who run advertisements against the linked-to content,
and raises the concern that copyright holders who make their works available on the
Internet without technical restrictions may lose control of how their works are
presented and disseminated.316
2. Liability for providing a link vs. Liability for facilitating actual access
through a link?
In the E.U., the CJEU’s construction of the “making available” right establishes
that an actor incurs liability for a “communication to the public” simply by offering
the public access to a work—a copyright holder need not prove that any member of
the public in fact accessed the work.317 By contrast, while the weight of authority in
the U.S. indicates that a violation of the § 106 public performance or display rights
may require only an “offer” to perform or display a work,318 some U.S. case law
indicates that a violation of the distribution right might require proof of an actual
transfer of a work; a mere “offer” to transfer a copy of the work (that is, making the
work available for downloading) may not suffice without additional proof of actual
downloads.319

work to a user’s computer from an authorized source website, a link to an authorized source does enable
an act of direct infringement).
315. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (noting the importance of the principle of “universal
free linking”); Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶ 31 (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6 (noting the importance of finding “a fair balance between, on one hand, the
interests of copyright holders . . . and, on the other, the protection of the interests and fundamental rights
of users of protected objects, in particular their freedom of expression and of information, . . . and of the
general interest.”).
316. See supra notes 163–165 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns).
317. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 22, art. 3.
318. See, e.g., Cmty. Broad. Serv. v. Time Warner Cable, LLC, No. 07-139-B-W, 2008 WL
3200661, at *9-10 (D. Me. Aug. 7, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff alleging a performance “to the public”
need only allege that the transmission “was capable of being viewed by a substantial number of people,”
and that the plaintiff “need not prove that a substantial number of people actually viewed the challenged
transmission.”).
319. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding
that “[t]he general rule, supported by the great weight of authority, is that infringement of [the distribution
right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords”); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v.
Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that the distribution right guaranteed by the
Copyright Act may be infringed by an offer to distribute, although merely alleging that files were made
available, without alleging that they were also distributed, is not enough to state a claim). But see LondonSire Records v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that “evidence and allegations,
taken together, [can be] sufficient to allow a statistically reasonable inference that at least one copyrighted
work was downloaded at least once” and that this inference is “sufficient to make out a prima facie case”
of infringement). See also supra notes 153–158 and accompanying text.

GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018)

220

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[41:2

The following scenario illustrates the difference between liability for offering
downloads and liability for actual downloads. Were it necessary to prove actual
downloads, then a U.S. copyright holder who brings a claim of secondary
infringement on the basis of a link to an unauthorized source of a work would need
to show completed acts at both the primary and secondary levels of infringement.
Thus, she would be required to prove (i) that a member of the public in fact clicked
on the URL that the defendant-linker supplied, and (ii) that the activation of the URL
actually resulted in a distribution of the work. If the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant-linker’s URL was clicked, the defendant would argue that, even though
the link it provided had the potential to facilitate an act of direct infringement,
without proof of the realization of that potential, the link did not in fact “materially
contribute”320 to an act of infringement. Further, if the plaintiff failed to prove that
the linked-to source actually delivered a digital copy of the work (rather than merely
offered downloads), the defendant could invoke case law establishing that the
“general rule” in the U.S. holds that an “infringement [of the distribution right]
requires an actual dissemination” and thus no act of direct infringement has been
established.321
In practice, U.S. courts have grappled with neither of these questions in
hyperlinking cases. In the reported hyperlinking cases, U.S. courts typically have
not required the copyright holder to prove that the defendant’s link enabled an actual
distribution of the work to an Internet audience.322 Despite this oversight, those U.S.
courts bound by precedent establishing that an “actual dissemination” is necessary
for a violation of the distribution right should, in theory, not overlook a plaintiff’s
inability to show that a defendant’s link actually caused the dissemination of a
copyrighted work to a user’s computer. That said, this tortuous reasoning applies
only to offers to download: U.S. authorities have not required proof of actual
communications when plaintiffs allege violations of the rights of public performance
or display.323 As a result, claims involving links to unauthorized streaming sites
would appear to forgo the hurdles of proving either that the user clicked on the link
or that the site in fact streamed the content to the user.
3. Comparing U.S. standards for secondary liability and E.U. standards for
direct liability
Some commentators have observed that the CJEU’s imposition of a knowledgebased standard after GS Media, albeit providing the basis for direct liability for
facilitation of infringement of the right of communication to the public, in fact
320. Livnat v. Lavi, No. 96 CIV. 4967 (RWS), 1998 WL 43221 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998).
321. Atl. Recording Corp., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
322. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1292 (noting that “[i]t is undisputed that
defendants [provided] three website addresses of websites containing [plaintiff’s copyrighted works]” but
neglecting to discuss whether any of those websites actually provided the underlying work to Internet
users, or whether defendant’s links were actually used to access any of these source websites).
323. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (citing case law and the opinion of the U.S.
Copyright Office establishing that a claim for infringement of the public display or performance rights
does not require proof of an actual communication of the work).
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resembles a secondary or contributory infringement standard.324 As a result, even
though U.S. courts have declined to hold linkers directly liable for infringement that
they facilitate, and therefore address claims against linkers as matters of secondary
liability, E.U. standards of direct liability for facilitation of infringement seem to
parallel U.S. standards of derivative liability. The legal standard under both regimes
focuses on similar questions, and may reach similar results.
Mere Supplier of Means vs. Acts of Communication / Secondary Infringement?—
The standard under both U.S. and E.U. law requires a consideration of the
significance of the defendant’s action; both regimes seek to distinguish between
actors who merely supply the means to commit acts of infringement and actors who
take a more intentional and active role in enabling infringement. In the U.S.,
contributory liability analysis requires an inquiry into whether the defendant
“materially contributed” to an act of direct infringement, which requires more than a
“‘mere quantitative contribution’ to the primary infringement . . . [p]articipation in
the infringement must be ‘substantial.’”325 The CJEU has distinguished between the
mere provision of facilities for making a communication and the performance of a
more “active” or “essential role” in the communication. 326 Case law from both
jurisdictions confirms that the provision of a hyperlink to a location on the Internet
is a sufficiently significant act to satisfy the threshold criterion for imposing liability
on the link provider, even if the hyperlink merely made it easier for end-users to
access a website which would have been available to them without the hyperlink.327
324. Eleonora Rosati, The CJEU Pirate Bay Judgment and Its Impact on the Liability of Online
Platforms, EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 11 (forthcoming manuscript) (on file with
https://perma.cc/F7JJ-LCBM) (“It has been argued that, by introducing a knowledge requirement within
the scope of primary liability, the CJEU has blurred the distinction between what has traditionally regarded
as a strict liability tort (primary infringement) and liability informed by the defendant’s subjective state of
actual or constructive knowledge (secondary infringement).”); See also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Court of
Justice of the European Union Creates an EU Law of Liability for Facilitation of Copyright Infringement:
Observations on Brein v. Filmspeler [C-527/15] (2017) and Brein v. Ziggo [C-610/15] (2017) 2-3
(Columbia Law and Economics, Paper No. 572), available at https://perma.cc/2K3X-S6WM (English
translation of article appearing in French at 2016/5-6 AUTEURS ET MEDIAS 401 (2017)).
325. Livnat, 1998 WL 43221 at *3.
326. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 22, ¶ 27 (“The mere provision of physical facilities
for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to [an act of] communication.”). This
language derives from the Agreed Statement to Article 8 WCT. See WCT, supra note 6, art. 8 (“It is
understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not
in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention.”). The
CJEU has held that a defendant commits an “act of communication” when that defendant performs an
“essential role” in the making available of a particular work, by “interven[ing], in full knowledge of the
consequences of his action, to give [users] access to a protected work, particularly where, in the absence
of that intervention, those [users] would not be able to enjoy the . . . work, or would be able to do so only
with difficulty.” Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV (June 14, 2017) at
¶ 26, https://perma.cc/C3D3-AXXG.
327. See supra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. courts have typically found
that providing a hyperlink to an unauthorized source, in addition to some minimal activity encouraging or
prompting users to use the hyperlink, suffices to constitute a “material contribution” to an act of direct
infringement); See also Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶ 26 (noting that a defendant commits an act of
communication even if, “in the absence of [the defendant’s] intervention, . . . [users] would be able to
[access the infringing source of the work] only with difficulty”); Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack
Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler) (Apr. 26, 2017), ¶ 49, https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F. (“[W]here it is
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Knowledge and Inducement—Under both U.S. and E.U. law, a defendant may
face liability (i) if the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of the specific works
to which it facilitated access,328 or alternatively (ii) if the defendant actively induced
users to access infringing works, even if the defendant did not know or have reason
to know of the specific works to which it facilitates access.329 Thus, a defendantlinker who supplies a deep or in-line link could face liability under either regime
because such a link necessarily relates to one particular source and one particular
copyrighted work, and thus a plaintiff will be able to establish that the defendant
knew of the specific work to which it enabled access. And a defendant-linker who
supplies a simple link to a website which aggregates infringing content (who may
not know, or have reason to know, of the particular works to which it facilitates
access through the simple link) may face liability under either regime if the defendant
actively induced users to use the link to gain unauthorized access to a copyrighted
work.
Liability for hyperlinking in both the U.S. and the E.U. also requires that the
defendant have knowledge (actual, constructive, or presumed) of the infringing
nature of the work to which it facilitated access. In GS Media, the CJEU established
a rebuttable presumption that a defendant who provides a hyperlink “for profit” does
so “with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and the possible lack
of consent to publication on the Internet by the copyright holder.”330 Thus, many
established that such a person knew or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted provides access
to a work illegally placed on the internet, the provision of that link constitutes a ‘communication to the
public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”).
328. Under traditional contributory liability analysis in the U.S., the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the specific acts of direct infringement that it facilitated.
Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 117-18. This standard is based on specific knowledge: the defendant must
have known, or must have had reason to know, of the specific works which it has facilitated infringement
of. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 102 (“[I]f a computer system operator learns of specific infringing
material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of
and contributes to direct infringement.”). Similarly, the Ziggo case confirmed that, as a matter of EU law,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in “full knowledge of the consequences of his action,” and
that a plaintiff can meet this requirement by establishing that the defendant could not have been unaware”
of the infringing nature of the conduct it facilitated. Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶¶ 26, 45. The Ziggo decision
implies that evidence that the defendant “classif[ies] the works under different categories” and “delete[s]
obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter[s] some content,” which necessarily establishes that the
defendant had knowledge of the specific works to which it was facilitating access, is relevant to the
knowledge analysis. See id. ¶ 38.
329. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005)
(establishing the doctrine of inducement of infringement in the U.S., through which a plaintiff may prevail
on a secondary infringement claim even if the plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant knew or had reason
to know of the specific works to which it facilitated access); Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶¶ 50-51
(holding the defendant liable without addressing whether the defendant had specific knowledge of the
particular works to which it facilitated access).
330. Sanoma, Case C-160/15, ¶ 51 (“[W]hen the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can
be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure that the work
concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be
presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and
the possible lack of consent to publication on the Internet by the copyright holder. In such circumstances,
and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink to a work which
was illegally placed on the Internet constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of
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plaintiffs in E.U. hyperlinking cases will be spared the burden of proving that the
defendant (with a profit motive) knew of the infringing nature of the work.
U.S. law does not recognize such a “for profit” presumption of knowledge.331
Most U.S. hyperlinking cases have not required courts to ascertain the defendants’
knowledge of the infringing nature of the work because such knowledge was obvious
from the factual record.332 However, in cases in which the defendant’s knowledge
of the infringing nature of the work is not so clear, plaintiffs may nonetheless be able
to argue that the defendant’s knowledge of the infringing nature of the work should
be presumed based on identifying characteristics of a website or the nature and
format of the copyrighted work.333
4. Comparing Safe Harbor regimes in the U.S. and the E.U.
The E.U. and U.S. safe harbors also appear to operate similarly, although the level
of knowledge that will disqualify a U.S. service provider may be somewhat higher,
particularly given the textual disparity between U.S. law’s preclusion of a duty to
monitor, and the E.U.’s rejection of a “general duty to monitor” 334 (which,
accordingly, leaves room for a specific duty to monitor, for example, to ensure that
infringing content, once taken down, stays down). 335 In the E.U., the service
provider may be obliged to take down of its own accord recurring user-posted links
to infringing sources, while it is less clear that a U.S. copyright owner may impose
such an obligation on a U.S. service provider. On the other hand, while U.S. law
includes a safe harbor specifically for the benefit of search engines and providers of

Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”). But see supra note 69 (discussing recent German case law
disregarding this rebuttable presumption in cases regarding the liability of search engines). In Ziggo, the
CJEU did not apply the rebuttable presumption of knowledge announced in GS Media, perhaps because
it was abundantly clear that the defendant was acting in full knowledge of the illicit nature of the
communications that it was facilitating. See Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶ 45.
331. In general, the relevance of the commercial character of a defendant’s conduct seems much
more significant in E.U. cases than in U.S. cases. See Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, ¶ 34 (noting that the
“profit-making nature of a communication, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, is not
irrelevant”); Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶ 29 (same). In the U.S., the “commercial character” of a defendant’s
conduct may be relevant only in the context of a claim of inducement of infringement, which requires a
plaintiff to prove that the defendant built a business model structured around infringing use. See MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at 936.
332. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 197–201 (discussing case law in which courts have considered such
presumptions based on the names and characteristics of the works shared).
334. 17 U.S.C. sec c. 512(m); Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art. 15 (emphasis supplied).
335. See, e.g., Rapidshare I, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, I
ZR 18/11, 2012, ¶¶ 19 & 31 (Ger.) (holding that in “specific cases” once a right-holder informs a service
provider of infringement, the service provider must do “everything that is . . . technically and
economically reasonable to prevent further infringements”); GEMA v. RapidShare AG, Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 80/12, 2013, ¶. 39 (Ger.) (holding that a service
provider who was notified of claimed infringement was required to monitor content uploaded by its users
to prevent further infringement). But see Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des
Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959 (holding that a general,
preventative, time-unlimited duty to monitor a system for infringements would violate the prohibition of
general monitoring obligations under art. 15 eCommerce Directive).
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links, the eCommerce directive requires creative judicial exposition to reach these
actors.336 Nonetheless, the knowledge standard the CJEU has now engrafted onto a
prima facie case of infringement of the communication to the public right by
facilitation of infringement may well fill the gap between the activities shielded on
the back end by U.S. law, and activities excluded on the front end by the knowledge
requirement in the E.U.

336. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting EU cases in which courts have implied that
search engines may be able to claim safe harbor under art. 14 eCommerce Directive).

